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Is the Constitution a Suicide Pact?
Daniel Avila*
In 1985, the Duquesne Law Review published a comprehen-
sive article ("the Original Article") reviewing the historical status
of suicide under the law.' The Original Article took "an approach
grounded in history"2 to refute the claim that suicide is so rooted
in the traditions of our country as to enjoy constitutional protec-
tion under a "fundamental right of privacy."3 After an exhaus-
tive examination of the historical record, the article concluded
that a judicial declaration recognizing suicide as a fundamental
right "would be a use of judicial power unwarranted by history."4
The article's findings cannot, even now, be seriously challenged,
though there have been occasional judicial attempts since 1985
to revise the historical record contrary to the evidence.5
Since 1985, several developments in the courts have raised
new constitutional questions not fully considered in the Original
Article. This article examines the recent cases and critiques the
approaches taken within those cases which ignore the lessons of
history.6 The article concludes that no basis exists, historical or
otherwise, for converting the Constitution into a "suicide pact."
7
* Chief Staff Counsel, National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent & Dis-
abled, Inc.; A.B., St. Francis College (Indiana); J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law.
This Article was funded by a grant from the Knights of Columbus to the National Legal
Center. The author appreciates the assistance of Thomas J. Marzen, Jane E. T.
Brockmann and Paul B. Linton in framing the arguments raised herein.
1. Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 1,
15 (1985).
2. Id. at 15 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 n.2 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
3. Id. at 14-17.
4. Id. at 147.
5. People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, slip op. at 19-25 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne
County 1994); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 807-10 (9th Cir. 1996),
en banc, cert. granted sub noma. Washington v. Glucksberg (U.S. July 19, 1996) (No. 96-
110).
6. This article also expands on many of the excellent points made in James Bopp,
Jr., Is Assisted Suicide Constitutionally Protected?, 3 IssuEs IN LAw & MED. 113 (1987).
7. "'[Wlhile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is
not a suicide pact.'" Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,309 (1981) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)). See also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37
(1949) (Burton, J., dissenting) (stating: "In the long run, maintenance of free speech will
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I. FROM 1985 TO THE PRESENT: WHERE ARE WE Now?
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health' recognizing
in principle a person's liberty interest in refusing tube-provided
food and fluids despite the inevitable consequence of death.9 In
1992, the Supreme Court refused in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey10 to demote abortion from its
status as a constitutional right." In doing so, the Court opined
that decisions protected by the Constitution involve "intimate
and personal choices" and concern "the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life."
12
The Cruzan and Casey rulings have spurred several constitu-
tional challenges against state laws banning assisted suicide in
Michigan, 13 Washington, 4 New York, 15 California" and Flor-
ida.' 7 The plaintiffs in these cases have asserted that assisted
suicide provides another means of hastening death and repre-
sents another intimate choice touching on the "mystery" of exist-
ence and nonexistence. As noted by one court, however, the
plaintiffs "make no attempt to argue that physician assisted sui-
cide, even in the case of terminally ill patients, has any historic
recognition as a legal right." 8 Instead, the plaintiffs have
argued that assisted suicide should be elevated to the same con-
be more endangered if the population can have no protection from the abuses which lead
to violence. No liberty is made more secure by holding that its abuses are inseparable
from its enjoyment .... This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that civil
liberty means the removal of all restraints from these crowds and that all local attempts
to maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the citizen. The choice is not between
order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is
danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wis-
dom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
8. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
9. Id. at 279.
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11. Id. at 851.
12. Id.
13. Hobbins v. Att'y Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. App.) & People v. Kevorkian, 517
N.W.2d 293 (Mich. App.), rev'd in part & affd in part, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d
714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995); see also People v. Kevorkian, 534
N.W.2d 172 (Mich. App. 1995), petition for cert. filed, Kevorkian v. Michigan, 65 U.S.L.W.
3086 (U.S. July 25, 1996) (No. 96-135).
14. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) en banc, cert.
granted, Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.W.L. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1. 1996) (No. 96-110).
15. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill, 65
U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
16. Kevorkian v. Arnett, No. CV94-6089CBM(Kx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1996).
17. McIver v. Krischer (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach County 2d Amended Complaint
filed June 21, 1996) (No. CL-96-1504-AF).
18. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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stitutional status as treatment refusals and abortion regardless
of its prior status in our nation's history and legal tradition.
The claim that assisted suicide is a constitutionally protected
right has been upheld by two federal appellate courts in Compas-
sion in Dying v. Washington'9 and Quill v. Vacco.20 In particular,
the United States Courts of Appeal for the Ninth and Second Cir-
cuits have struck down the assisted suicide bans of Washington
and New York on the grounds that the bans violated constitu-
tional guarantees protecting the supposed right of terminally ill
persons to hasten their deaths.2'
Both courts concluded that history and tradition can no longer
shield laws banning assisted suicide from constitutional attack.
While the Second Circuit made no attempt to justify its break
from the past, the Ninth Circuit spent considerable effort to
explain why it abandoned history and tradition to overturn
Washington's ban. Using the opinion for Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey22 as a starting point, the
Compassion court insisted that federal courts could override
state policies no matter how dominant the policies have been in
the course of our history and tradition.'s The court also argued
that history and tradition were unreliable indicators of assisted
suicide's constitutional status for several reasons.
19. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793-94.
20. Quill, 80 F.3d at 731.
21. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Washington's ban violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process by "bar[ring what for many termi-
nally ill patients is the only palatable, and only practical, way of ending their lives."
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832, 838. The Second Circuit concluded that New York
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection by "not treat[ing]
equally all competent persons who are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish to
hasten death"; those on life support are permitted to hasten death by withdrawing treat-
ment while those who are not on life support are prevented from hastening death by
physician assisted suicide. Quill, 80 F.3d at 727, 729.
While the Ninth Circuit's Due Process analysis is flawed, the Second Circuit's
Equal Protection analysis is even more difficult to defend. A statutory scheme that uni-
formly bans assisted suicide, including physician-prescribed lethal overdoses but not
including treatment refusals, applies equally to everyone. On one hand, both individuals
on life support and individuals not on life support are permitted to refuse the initiation of
,new treatment and direct the removal of ongoing treatment. On the other hand, both
groups of individuals are precluded from receiving physician assistance in suicide
through the prescription of a lethal overdose. Moreover, all physicians are free to assist
their patients by withdrawing or withholding treatment upon patient request while at
the same time the physicians are subject to prosecution for dispensing lethal prescrip-
tions to the patients. Thus, the law imposes the same burden on every individual. See
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-88 (1979) (observing that a law
placing "a meaningful restriction on all" persons "is one of general applicability and satis-
fies the equal protection principle without further inquiry"). Instead of discriminating
against persons, New York has simply classified a species of actions as criminal.
22. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
23. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 805 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 852).
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First, the court claimed that "the relevant historical record is
* . . checkered" and cited to the few known expressions in the
record of the minority position favoring assisted suicide.2' Sec-
ond, the court referred to current polling data suggesting public
support for active measures to hasten death.2 Third, the court
pointed to "the lack of enforcement" of anti-assisted suicide laws
as purported proof of "widespread societal disaffection with such
laws."26 Fourth, the court referred to a supposedly "strong
undercurrent of a time-honored but hidden practice" of assisted
suicide that runs "beneath the official history of legal condemna-
tion of physician-assisted suicide .... -27 Finally, the court con-
tended that as a result of technological developments,
"Americans frequently die with less dignity than they did in the
days when ravaging diseases typically ended their lives
quickly."'
Even assuming the accuracy of the Ninth Circuit court's fac-
tual underpinnings, the line of argument outlined above, which
is wholly legislative in nature, fails to respond to a critical legal
issue at stake in assisted suicide: What constitutional principle
forbids the states to adopt an anti-assisted suicide policy when
history and tradition fully support such a policy choice? Refer-
ences to polling data, however current, and to aberrant criminal
practices, however "time-honored", cannot answer this ques-
tion.29  While such extra-constitutional considerations may
prompt the legislatures to initiate changes, they provide no war-
rant for forcing the legislatures to change venerable state poli-
cies at the behest of federal judges.
The rulings of the Ninth and Second Circuits would be easy to
dismiss if the only basis was a sociological one. If banning
assisted suicide is so unpopular, then it is the role of the legisla-
tures, not the role of the courts, to respond accordingly. The
Ninth and Second Circuit courts, however, argued either explic-
itly3 ° or implicitly3' that any apparent societal approval for
24. Id. at 806-10.
25. Id. at 810.
26. Id. at 811.
27. Id.
28. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 812.
29. Id. at 1449 (Trott, J., dissenting from order rejecting request for rehearing en
banc by full court) (noting: "The Constitution's explicit provisions for amendment rely on
government process, not on random sampling of public opinion. Polls are for the other
branches of our government, not for the judiciary.")
30. Id. at 810 (stating: "Most Americans simply do not appear to view [acts hasten-
ing death in order to avoid pain and suffering] as constituting suicide, and there is much
support in reason for that conclusion") (citation omitted).
31. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729 (criticizing New York's reliance on certain definitional
distinctions).
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assisted suicide evidences a constitutional rule far more reason-
able than that presented by history and tradition.
As a consequence, the Compassion in Dying and Quill courts
have asserted that: 1) as a means of hastening death, assisted
suicide cannot rationally be distinguished for definitional pur-
poses from treatment refusals or the provision of pain relief; 2) as
an "intimate and personal" choice, assisted suicide is a cogniza-
ble interest worthy of constitutional protection; and 3) any state
interference with such an interest is irrational in cases involving
mentally competent, terminally ill adults who desire to avoid
suffering.
The following analysis examines these assertions more closely
from a constitutional perspective. The analysis suggests that the
assertions not only conflict with history and tradition, but also
contradict the constitutional analysis employed by the United
States Supreme Court in other contexts. Ultimately, this analy-
sis illustrates that the assertions fail to present a persuasive
basis for overturning state bans against assisted suicide by con-
stitutional mandate.
II. DOES THE CONSTITUTION TAKE SIDES IN THE ETHICAL AND
POLITICAL DEBATE OVER THE DEFINITION OF
THE CRIME OF ASSISTED SUICIDE?
The states have defined the crime of assisted suicide in such a
manner as to exclude an individual's choice to forego medical
treatment and a physician's provision of pain relief, but to
include physician-prescribed lethal overdoses of medication.
Pursuant to claims brought by terminally ill persons seeking sui-
cide assistance and physicians willing to provide such assistance,
the Ninth and Second Circuits have concluded that this defini-
tional approach is irrational.
In Compassion in Dying, the Ninth Circuit questioned "as a
definitional matter" whether "the terms 'suicide' and 'assisted
suicide' are appropriate legal descriptions" of a physician's pre-
scription of a lethal drug overdose to a suicidal patient.32 Accord-
ing to the court, other actions tending to hasten death such as
treatment refusals and pain relief measures are not considered
forms of suicide and thus "a decision by a terminally ill patient to
hasten by medical means a death that is already in process...
should [also] not be classified as suicide."33
In Quill, the Second Circuit contradicted the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning and ruled that the "ending of life by [the withdrawal of
32. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 802.
33. Id. at 824.
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treatment and the administration of palliative drugs] is nothing
more or less than assisted suicide." 4 According to the Quill
court, since New York law permitted these forms of "suicide," it
must also permit physicians to prescribe lethal overdoses of med-
ication at least in cases involving suicidal persons with terminal
conditions. 5
Both the Ninth and Second Circuit courts used their own con-
flicting, highly contestable, and historically untenable definitions
of the crime of assisted suicide. Their definitional analysis was
crucial to their constitutional findings that laws against assisted
suicide should not apply to physician prescribed lethal overdoses
of medication. Importantly, by refusing to defer to the states'
definition of the crime of assisted suicide, the courts have
exceeded their constitutional authority.
A. The States Have the Exclusive Right to Define Crimes
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that "[iut is the
legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime."36 More-
over, the Court has noted that "the discretion to define criminal
offenses and prescribe punishments resides wholly with the state
legislatures. Whatever limitations the Constitution imposes
on the states with respect to "the administration of criminal jus-
tice", none "concern... the powers of the States to define crime
.... Indeed, the federal courts have little constitutional basis
for "second guessing"39 a state's criminal definition, especially
when it enjoys broad "historical and contemporary acceptance."40
As the Supreme Court noted, "[iln fine, history and current prac-
tices are significant indicators of what we as a people regard as
fundamentally fair and rational ways of defining criminal
offenses."4 1
34. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
35. Id. at 729, 731.
36. Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 424 (1959) (citations omitted).
37. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984) (citing Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) & Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952)).
38. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168.
39. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 638 (1991) (Souter, J., plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 642.
41. Id. at 643. See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 64 U.S.L.W. 4500, 4501 (U.S. June
13, 1996) (No. 95-566) (stating: "Preventing and dealing with crime is much more the
business of the States than it is of the Federal Government, and ... we should not lightly
construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the indi-
vidual states") (internal quotation marks omitted); Id. at 4506 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(finding that "states enjoy wide latitude in defining the elements of criminal
offenses.... ."); Id. at 4509 (O'Connor, J., dissenting on other grounds, joined by Stevens,
Souter & Breyer, JJ.) (noting: "A state legislature certainly possesses the authority to
define the offenses it wishes to punish. If the Montana legislature chose to redefine this
206 Vol. 35:201
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In view of these precedents, the Ninth and Second Circuits
lacked the authority to interfere with the right of Washington
and New York to define the crime of assisted suicide. The deci-
sion by these states to include physician prescribed lethal over-
doses within the scope of the criminal offense of assisted suicide,
while at the same time excluding treatment refusals and pain
relief measures, by no means constituted "a freakish definition"
with "no analogue in history or in the criminal law of other
jurisdictions. "42
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit pointed to "drastic changes" in
recent history whereby the states have purportedly permitted
"self-starvation" and "death-inducing medication . . . [with] a
pain-relieving purpose."' According to the Compassion in Dying
court, these changes required the states to "explain precisely
what it is about the physician's conduct in assisted suicide cases
that distinguishes it from the conduct that the state has explic-
itly authorized."" For its part, the Second Circuit referred to a
concurring opinion by Justice Scalia in the Cruzan case45 and a
student law review note46 as authoritative bases for questioning
New York's definition.47
Both the Ninth and Second Circuit abandoned any pretense of
assuming a deferential posture to the states and attacked each
and every rationale offered by Washington and New York in
defense of the states' definition of assisted suicide.,' Impor-
tantly, in doing so, the Compassion in Dying and Quill courts
rejected certain definitional distinctions that the Supreme Court
has employed or even found to be constitutionally mandated in
other cases. As the next section explains, such precedent indi-
cates that if the Constitution takes any position in the debate
over the meaning of assisted suicide, it sides with the states.
offense so as to alter the requisite mental-state element, the due process problem
presented in this case would not be at issue").
42. Schad, 501 U.S. at 640.
43. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822.
44. Id.
45. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
46. Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105
HARv. L. REv. 2021, 2028-31 (1992).
47. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
48. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822-24; Quill, 80 F.3d at 729-30.
2071996
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B. The Supreme Court Has Recognized and Even Mandated
the Use of Many Distinctions Relied Upon by the States
in Defining Assisted Suicide.
The Ninth and Second Circuit rulings opposed state reliance
on a distinction between "action" and "inaction."49 The rulings
also criticized any distinction between actions having a single
negative effect and actions having both a positive effect and a
negative "double effect."50 Finally, both Circuits failed to recog-
nize any distinction between acts having the effect of hastening
death and acts performed for the purpose of hastening death.51
For example, according to the Ninth Circuit:
[W]e see little, if any, difference for constitutional . . . purposes
between providing medication with a double effect and providing med-
ication with a single effect, as long as one of the known effects in each
case is to hasten the end of the patient's life. Similarly, we see no
ethical or constitutionally cognizable difference between a doctor's
pulling the plug on a respirator and his prescribing drugs which will
permit a terminally ill patient to end his own life. In fact, some might
argue that pulling the plug is a more culpable and aggressive act on
the doctor's part and provides more reason for criminal prosecution.
To us, what matters most is that the death of the patient is the
intended result as surely in one case as in the other.52
The Ninth Circuit's references to "constitutional purposes" and
"constitutionally cognizable differences" cannot be squared with
Supreme Court precedent. In at least three lines of cases, the
Supreme Court has relied upon and even mandated such
distinctions.
1. DeShaney v. Winnebago County
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices, 3 the Supreme Court rejected a claim that social workers for
a state child protection agency violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to take into protective
custody a child who eventually was severely injured by his abu-
sive father. The evidence indicated that the social workers had
received several reports of suspected abuse and either knew or
should have known the risks facing the child. After briefly mov-
ing the child into protective custody, the agency returned him to
his father after deeming the evidence of abuse to be insufficient.
Even after several more reports of abuse occurred, the agency
49. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822; Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
50. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 823, 824.
51. Id. at 824, 828; Quill, 80 F.3d at 730.
52. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 824 (emphasis added).
53. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
208 Vol. 35:201
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still did not take action. The father then beat the child, causing
severe brain damage that required the child to.be institutional-
ized, and he was subsequently convicted of abuse.54
By a six to three majority, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed a limitation only
"on the State's power to act," not failure to act.55 Therefore,
under the circumstances of DeShaney, the state agency's failure
to intervene, its "inaction", did not affirmatively "deprive [the
child] of his liberty interest in 'freedom from . . .unjustified
intrusions on personal security'" because a private individual
rather than the state caused the child's injuries.56
Moreover, the Supreme Court distinguished the state agency's
decision to return the child to the father, who then abused the
child, from state action affirmatively depriving an individual of
life, liberty or property. While the state exposed the child to a
known risk by returning him to the father, the act of returning
the child neither created an independent threat of harm nor left
the child worse off than if the state had not taken the child into
custody in the first place.57 According to the Court, "it is well to
remember once again that the harm was inflicted not by the
State .. , but by [the child's] father."58
The Court did recognize, however, that a state's failure to pro-
tect individuals from private harm may nevertheless violate the
Constitution if the inaction is preceded by "the State's affirma-
tive act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own
behalf."59 If the state's actions is indeed preceded by such an
affirmative act, a special duty arises obligating the state to
extend affirmative protections to the individual. Thus, if "by the
affirmative exercise of its power" the state agency in DeShaney
had so restrained the abused child's liberty that it rendered him
"unable to care for himself," and failed to "provide for [the child's]
basic human needs [and reasonable safety]," then the state could
have been constitutionally liable for his subsequent injuries."°
While the child's representatives in DeShaney conceded that
the child sustained his injuries while in the custody of his father
and outside of the state's control, they argued that the social
workers' knowledge of the risk of private harm to the child and
expressions of concern for his safety provided an alternative
54. Id.
55. Id. at 195.
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 201.
58. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 203.




basis for creating a constitutional duty to protect him.61 Impor-
tantly, the Court rejected this claim because "[w]hile the State
may have been aware of the dangers that [the child] faced in the
free world, it played no part in their creation".62 According to the
Court, under the Constitution an "affirmative duty to protect
arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predica-
ment or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the
limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
behalf."
6
The Supreme Court's analysis in DeShaney both highlights
the constitutional relevance of a distinction between action and
inaction when defining the responsibility of state actors and bol-
sters the relevance of such a distinction in the assisted suicide
context. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's reasoning, while state
actions directly interfering with personal freedoms will always
implicate a duty of non-interference, whether state inaction vio-
lates a duty to protect individuals against private interference
depends on the circumstances. More simply put, the states will
always be constitutionally subject to liability for injuries caused
by state action, but culpability for state inaction will depend on
the presence or absence of a special duty. The states are deemed
to be constitutionally responsible for their own acts in every cir-
cumstance, but will not always be responsible for declining to
prevent harm caused by other sources.
In the assisted suicide context, the states have imposed a duty
on private individuals to refrain from helping to take others' lives
and thereby established a duty analogous to the Constitution's
limitation on the states' power to act. This duty applies to all
actions that directly take life. Thus, the failure to refrain from
directly taking life implicates the duty against taking life.6
61. One of the social workers testified that "'I just knew the phone would ring some
day and Joshua would be dead.'" Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting from trial
record).
62. Id. at 201.
63. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
64. PRESmENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvIoRAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECI-
SIONS 33 (1983) (providing- 'The law ordinarily holds individuals liable only for the inju-
rious consequences of their acts, not for the injurious consequences of omissions of
action."); NORMAN L. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 32 (1987) (noting:
"Law has traditionally refrained from imposing either criminal or civil liability on a per-
son for failure to save or rescue a dying individual - as opposed to affirmatively acting to
terminate another's existence, which is homicide."); THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON
LIFE AND THE LAw, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE
MEDICAL CoNTEXr 146 (1994) (hereinafter N. Y. TASK FORCE) (stating: "Existing law pro-
hibits assisted suicide and euthanasia in all cases. A similar ban for all decisions to stop
or withhold life-sustaining treatment would be unthinkable").
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The failure to save a life, however, incurs liability only if the
individual violates a special duty obliging the individual to act
accordingly. Thus, whether an individual will be culpable for
failing to save a life depends on whether a special duty to save a
life is imposed upon the individual, and whether the state
requires affirmative protection from these threats of harm.65
Consequently, not every decision to refrain from saving life will
subject an individual to liability for the death of another. This
duty-related difference provides an entirely rational basis for dis-
tinguishing between lethal prescriptions as "action" and the fore-
going of medical treatment as "inaction".
In Compassion in Dying and Quill, the Ninth and Second Cir-
cuits respectively contended that the distinction between action
and inaction is not constitutionally meaningful. Both Circuits
stated that in most cases, removing medical/life sustaining treat-
ment will require an act (i.e., turning off or disconnecting the
machinery), and hastened death foreseeably and inevitably
results from the removal of life-sustaining treatment as well as
from assisted suicide.6 Notably, for the Supreme Court to agree
with this analysis, it would have to abandon its DeShaney analy-
sis which posits "a constitutional setting that distinguishes
sharply between action and inaction."67
In response to the rationales set forth by the Ninth and Second
Circuits, the states could reasonably adopt the language of
DeShaney and assert that the "action" of disconnecting a respira-
tor, for example, "place[s a patient] in no worse position than
that in which the patient would have been had [the treatment
not been provided] at all."68 Under the Deshaney analysis, if an
individual's actions do not interfere with the life of another, then
in performing those actions the individual cannot violate the
duty to refrain from interfering with life.
To hold otherwise would broaden this duty from one that
encompasses only those actions which directly harm life to one
65. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Cal. App. 1983) (providing:
"In the final analysis, since we view petitioners' conduct as that of omission rather than
affirmative action, the resolution of this case turns on whether petitioners had a duty to
continue to provide life sustaining treatment").
66. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822; Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
67. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 201. The Supreme Court recognized a similarly sharp action/inaction
distinction in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), by observing:
When an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over
an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas
that courts often are called upon to protect. Similarly, when an agency does act to
enforce, that action itself provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the




that encompasses any action which a person performs while
another individual is threatened with harm from other sources.
The web of liability would spread far and wide, entangling even a
nurse in the hospital corridor who knows that a patient in a
nearby room is dying but walks past the room nonetheless. To
prove a breach of duty, one would need only point to some action
of the accused, such as the nurse's act of walking. Not only
would such a revision of the duty of non-interference implicate
substantial policy questions governing principles of liability, it
would place into question the right to engage in a wide range of
activities which enjoy constitutional protection and which do not,
under any reasonable analysis, constitute threats to life.
Withdrawing treatment may in some but not all circumstances
be a culpable act. For example, if an officious or malicious inter-
loper disconnects a patient's life-sustaining care without estab-
lishing the necessary relationship with the patient, either that of
principle and agent or ward and duly appointed surrogate, and
does so without the proper authorization, then the patient's
resulting death will give rise to criminal liability.
In other circumstances, the relationship between the individ-
ual withdrawing treatment and the person in need of treatment
may be marked by an affirmative duty to intervene. Certain
relationships oblige individuals to provide life sustaining care or
to arrange for its provision to others. This affirmative duty is
breached by a decision to deny or remove such care, depending on
the circumstances. 9
As a result, unlike the duty of noninterference with life which
pertains to all persons, duties to refrain from returning a patient
to a position no worse than would occur if no treatment were pro-
vided, and to provide life-sustaining care are not uniformly appli-
cable. With these duties, it is not the presence of an affirmative
act that determines culpability, but the nature of the relation-
ship between the actor and the injured person that counts.
Determining which relationships create certain duties
involves substantive policy choices that must take into account
an array of legislative evaluations that the federal courts are ill-
69. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DE 472-73 (2d ed. 1995) (listing the contrac-
tual undertaking, including the physician-patient relationship, and the voluntary
assumption of responsibility often accompanied by another's reliance as possible sources
of a duty to act); State v. Mally, 366 P.2d 868, 873 (Mont. 1961) (observing that while "the
large majority of homicide cases involving a failure to provide medical aid involve a par-
ent-child relationship," an individual could be subject to a duty to provide for an adult
who "is as helpless as a newborn." The court found that under the circumstances of this
case, the husband was obliged to find medical help for his wife); In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d
590 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994) (recognizing statutorily created duty
of hospital to provide stabilizing treatment to patients).
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equipped to make. The Supreme Court touched on an aspect of
this consideration in DeShaney when it concluded that: "Fram-
ers of the Constitution were content to leave the extent of govern-
mental obligation [ensuring that the state protected the people
from each other] to the democratic political processes."70
Nonetheless, the Ninth and Second Circuits have decided to go
where even the Supreme Court has feared to tread by ruling, in
effect, that whenever hastened death is a foreseeable conse-
quence of "inaction," a duty to act arises as if a special relation-
ship existed - regardless of the actual relationship at issue.7'
This assumption is crucial to the courts' holding that when the
states authorize the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment,
they are ratifying a breach of a duty toward life no different from
the breach that would occur in cases involving the direct taking
of life.
According to DeShaney, the Constitution forbids federal courts
from placing on state actors an affirmative duty to protect the
lives of private citizens from the threat of private harm.7 2 Thus
the Constitution should also be construed as forbidding federal
courts from positing a similarly broad duty in the withdrawal of
treatment context as a means of attacking the states' definition
of assisted suicide.
Creating such a broad duty by judicial fiat would interfere
with the states' ability to define special duties as a matter of pub-
lic policy, and do so in a manner particularly egregious in the
treatment refusal context. Generally, states recognize that while
a special duty to provide treatment arises from a physician-
patient relationship, such a duty contains certain exceptions.73
In particular, states may base an exception to this specific duty
on a patient's right to refuse touching, which is also a cognizable
right under the Due Process Clause.74 If a patient exercises the
70. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 196. The Framers, however, did not delegate unlimited
authority in this area since a state "may not, of course, selectively deny its protective
services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause."
Id. at 197 n.3.
71. These courts have thus argued that a physician removing life-sustaining treat-
ment will breach a duty towards the patient whenever hastened death is foreseeable,
regardless of any other circumstances. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822; Quill, 80
F.3d at 729. The Second Circuit relied specifically on this argument to conclude that
'[t]he ending of life by these means is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide." Quill,
80 F.3d at 729.
72. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202 (noting that while the social workers might
have been subject to a duty to protect the child under state tort law, this would not sup-
port a claim of injury under the Due Process Clause, "which, as we have said many times,
does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation").
73. MEISEL, supra note 68, at 392-93.
74. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222 (date).
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right to refuse bodily medical intrusions by withdrawing consent
to medical treatment, then the patient's physician is released
from the obligation to provide the treatment. This exception
avoids the imposition of a duty upon the physician to treat the
patient when such treatment directly contradicts the patient's
right not to be touched.75
The Constitution cannot reasonably be construed as recogniz-
ing for definitional purposes a duty to treat a patient in every
circumstance where a physician is aware that the failure to treat
will hasten the patient's death. At the same time, however, the
Constitution is construed as recognizing the right of a patient not
to be treated. The Supreme Court noted a similar conflict in
DeShaney:
In defense of [the state functionaries] it must also be said that had
they moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father,
they would likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding
into the parent-child relationship, charges based on the same Due
Process Clause that forms the basis of the present charge of failure to
provide adequate protection.
76
The preceding discussion demonstrates the jurisprudential
significance of a distinction between action and inaction. Rather
than rejecting such a distinction as irrelevant, the Supreme
Court in DeShaney adopted it as a workable measure of constitu-
tional culpability. Thus, despite the Ninth Circuit's contrary
claim in Compassion in Dying, the distinction is certainly not for-
eign to constitutional adjudication.
2. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney
In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the
Supreme Court adopted for constitutional purposes the same
"double effect" reasoning rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Com-
passion in Dying as purportedly irrelevant to constitutional con-
cerns. The Feeney case involved a claim that a state legislature
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
by enacting legislation which gave hiring preferences to military
veterans, most of whom were men.78
The Feeney plaintiffs conceded that the legislation was neutral
and that the legislators sought to achieve the constitutionally
75. DAVID W. MEYERS, MEDIcO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 140
(1981) (providing: "Throughout the course of treatment, the patient reserves the right to
discharge the physician and thereby terminate the physician-patient relationship. This
is a necessary adjunct to the patient's right to refuse medical care").
76. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
77. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
78. Id. at 259.
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permissible effect of benefitting veterans generally. The plain-
tiffs contended that the law had a double effect, however, because
it negatively impacted women in the hiring process in such a
manner so as to warrant a constitutional finding that the legisla-
ture intended this disparate impact.
According to the Court:
The appellee's [plaintiffs] ultimate argument rests upon the pre-
sumption, common to the criminal and civil law, that a person intends
the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions....
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as voli-
tion or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the deci-
sion maker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in
spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
79
The Court held that although a legislature's knowledge of a neu-
tral measure's inevitable negative impact may create "a strong
inference that the adverse effects were desired," . . . "in this
inquiry - made as it is under the Constitution - an inference is
a working tool, not a synonym for proof."80 In fact, any presump-
tion of discriminatory intent based on evidence that the legisla-
ture was aware of a statute's negative effect is rebuttable by
evidence showing that the legislative action was taken "because
of" its positive effect, and "in spite of' its negative effect.
Thus, neutral legislation designed to achieve a positive effect
that happens to place a foreseeable burden upon a particular
group is distinguishable as a matter of constitutional law from
legislation specifically designed to burden the group. Even
though in both cases a particular negative effect is foreseeable,
the two forms of legislative action are not constitutionally
equivalent.8 '
79. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 278-79.
80. Id. at 279 n.25.
81. The Court applied a similar analysis in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995), a racial redistricting case. In Miller, the Court observed that a legislature will
"almost always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race predomi-
nates in the redistricting process." Id. at 2488. The Court emphasized the constitutional
necessity of such a distinction even while acknowledging that the "distinction between
being aware of racial considerations [in redistricting plans] and being motivated by them
may be difficult to make." Id. See also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113
S.Ct. 753, 760 (1993) (rejecting claim that because only women obtain abortions, opposi-
tion to abortion necessarily is either based on an intent to discriminate against women,
or such a discriminatory intent can be presumed solely by reference to an activity's dispa-
rate impact against women); Id. at 763 (holding that the intent "to deprive a right"
demands that the individual "do more than merely be aware of a deprivation of right that
he causes, and more than merely accept it; he must act at least in part for the very pur-
pose of producing it").
In yet another context, the Supreme Court has recognized that in cases brought
under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, laws providing an indirect benefit to
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The Feeney analysis bears directly on the assisted suicide
cases. In Compassion in Dying, for example, the Ninth Circuit
contended that two classes of actions, refusing treatment or pro-
viding pain relief as one class, and lethal prescriptions as the
other, were indistinguishable for definitional and "constitutional
purposes... as long as one of the known effects in each case is to
hasten the end of the patient's life."82 The Court found that,
"what matters most is that the death of the patient is the
intended result as surely in one case as in the other."" In other
words, because death is a foreseeable consequence of both classes
of actions, the Court reasoned that both classes of actions consti-
tute irrebuttable proof of an intent to cause death irrespective of
the presence or absence of a dual positive effect.
This analysis both contradicts Feeney and conflicts with rea-
son. If the Supreme Court recognizes for constitutional purposes
a distinction between a statute with a known negative effect and
a statute with both a similar negative effect and an additional
positive effect, then the states could reasonably employ the same
distinction in the assisted suicide context.
Specifically, even if treatment refusals and pain relief meas-
ures foreseeably hasten death, they enable a patient to avoid
burdensome bodily intrusions and alleviate pain. Any resulting
inference of an intent to cause death from the use of such refus-
als and measures could, therefore, be rebutted by evidence indi-
cating that the patient chose these options "because of' their
positive effects and "in spite of" their death-hastening effect.
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,8 Jus-
tice Scalia asserted that "[sitarving oneself to death is no differ-
ent from putting a gun to one's own temple as far as the common
law definition of suicide is concerned" because both involve "the
suicide's conscious decision to 'pu[t] an end to his own exist-
ence." 5 Standing alone, Scalia's remark clearly overstates the
comparison. Given the different circumstances under which self-
starvation may occur, not all decisions resulting in starvation
would necessarily implicate to the same degree a "conscious deci-
sion" to take one's life.86
religion or coinciding with particular religious beliefs are not necessarily the product of a
legislative intent to establish religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 663 (1971)
(White, J., concurring). The lawmakers may still demonstrate that the law was enacted
despite its positive affect on religion and because of some other secular purpose. Id.
82. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 824.
83. Id.
84. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
85. Id. at 296-97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86. Justice Scalia's conceptual analysis in Cruzan, which irrebuttably presumes a
lethal intent based on the death-hastening consequences of starvation, conflicts with his
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For example, a stronger inference of an intent to end life would
arise if starvation is initiated by an individual who can eat with-
out medical assistance than if an individual starves as a result of
rejecting a feeding tube which provides the individual's nutri-
tion. In the second scenario, a fact upon which a rebuttal of the
inference of a suicidal intent could be based is clearly present.
Specifically, the intrusion of the feeding tube may indicate that
the individual's decision to "starve" was made because of a desire
to live free of burdensome intrusions.s7
Conversely, it may be difficult to rebut the inference of an
intent to choose death when the otherwise healthy individual
simply refuses to eat. Yet, in the case of an individual refusing a
feeding tube such an inference may arise, but nevertheless be
rebutted by evidence of an intent to avoid the feeding tube's
intrusion. Moreover, a lethal prescription undeniably has the
sole effect of causing death and thus constitutes strong proof of
an intent to cause death. In fact, given the absence of an addi-
tional positive effect, lethal prescriptions are far more likely than
treatment refusals or pain relief measures to be undertaken pur-
suant to a lethal intent."8
analysis in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 760-62 (1993). In
the majority opinion in Bray, Scalia rejected the contention that opposition to an activity
engaged in only by women proved "ipso facto" a conscious decision to discriminate against
women when there existed other "common and respectable reasons for opposing" the
activity. Id. at 760. The same is true in the assisted suicide context. There certainly are
"common and respectable reasons" for refusing medical treatment that have nothing to do
with purposely choosing death.
87. According to the Michigan Supreme Court: "A close examination of the medi-
cal-treatment cases suggests that they do not establish a right to choose 'nonlife' at all,
but rather a right to choose life's natural progression - a progression that, without fail,
includes for everyone the process of dying." People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728
n.44 (Mich. 1994). Thus, according to an influential group of ethicists:
Deliberately to deny food and water to... innocent human beings in order to bring
about their deaths is homicide, for it is the adoption by choice of a proposal to kill
them by starvation and dehydration.... However, when specific objective condi-
tions are met, the withholding and withdrawing of various forms of treatment,
including the provision of food and fluids by artificial means, do not necessarily
carry out a proposal to end life. One may rightly choose to withhold or withdraw a
means of preserving life if the means employed is judged either useless or exces-
sively burdensome.
William E. May et al., Feeding and Hydrating the Permanently Unconscious and Other
Vulnerable Persons, 3 IssuEs IN LAw & MED. 203, 207-08 (1987) (emphasis added).
88. An individual may purposely choose death as a means of obtaining a positive
effect of escaping or avoiding pain. Or an individual may purposely choose death as a
means of relieving family members from the "burden" of caring for the decedent while
alive. That fact that the individual is motivated by the prospect of achieving a positive
effect does not alter the above-described analysis. According to one commentator:
The definition of suicide requires that one's actions be carried out for the purpose of
bringing about death either as an end or as a means. The soldier who throws him-
self on the live grenade to save his companions, for example, is not aiming at death.
That is, he does not intentionally jump on the grenade for the purpose of bringing
about his death, but rather for the purpose saving his companions. This is clear if
Duquesne Law Review
Depending on the circumstances, therefore, the evidentiary
proof of a "conscious decision" to kill one's self may be diminished
and any resulting inference rebutted. This perhaps explains the
reason why Justice Scalia questioned the relevance of an abso-
lute distinction between withdrawing a feeding tube and assisted
suicide, while also "readily acknowledging" that a general dis-
tinction "has some bearing upon the legislative judgment of what
ought to be prevented as suicide".,9 The presence of a positive
effect potentially provides the necessary evidentiary basis for
rebutting any inference that a negative effect was intended.
However, the absence of a positive effect and the presence of a
negative effect bolsters such an inference.
Especially in light of Feeney, a definitional distinction based on
the presence or absence of a positive effect is constitutionally cog-
nizable, and thus the federal courts lack any constitutional basis
for rejecting the distinction in the assisted suicide context. The
states should be free to rely on the double effect distinction as a
rational basis for classifying certain acts as more likely than not
to be suicidal, while at the same time classifying other acts as
less likely to be suicidal because the acts are based on a non-
lethal intent.
3. Sandstrom v. Montana
Another line of Supreme Court decisions also provides consti-
tutional support for the distinction between acts having the
effect of hastening death and acts intended to hasten death. In
Sandstrom v. Montana,90 for example, the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that a conclusive presumption of an intent to com-
mit murder, based solely on proof that a victim's death was the
ordinary result of the defendant's voluntary act, violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
9 1
The Court determined in Montana that when intent is an ele-
ment of a crime, evidence of an act's natural effects cannot be
treated as irrebuttable proof of the requisite criminal intent. An
irrebuttable presumption of a criminal intent based solely on the
one considers that, if he lives and his companions are saved, then he would have
achieved his purpose without dying. For this reason, his act is not counted as sui-
cide. On the other hand, consider the man who kills himself so his family can enjoy
the proceeds from his life insurance. Clearly, he intentionally carries out his
actions for the purpose of bringing about death. He is aiming at his death, albeit as
a means to another end: if he lives, he would have failed in his purpose since,
without his death, no inheritance will be forthcoming.
Manuel G. Velasquez, Defining Suicide, 3 IssuEs IN LAw & MED. 37, 49 (1987) (emphasis
added).
89. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296.
90. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
91. Id. at 524.
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negative consequences of an act "would effectively eliminate
intent as an ingredient of the offense."92 As a result, such a pre-
sumption would inappropriately relieve the prosecution of its
constitutionally imposed burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt every element of the crime."
While evidence "may well support an inference" of criminal
intent, "the jury must remain free to consider additional evidence
before accepting or rejecting the inference."9 As a matter of pub-
lic policy, this approach preserves the overall presumption of
innocence from evil intent and recognizes the possibility that not
all actions with harmful consequences are intentionally under-
taken for that purpose.
The courts have taken a similar approach in the civil context.
For example, in life insurance cases involving the self-inflicted
death of individuals under suspicious circumstances, courts gen-
erally presume that the death was accidental. As Gary Schuman
has noted:
The presumption against suicide is based on the nearly universal
characteristics of love of life and fear of death. The premise is that a
person's natural instincts are to avoid injury and preserve life and
that it is more reasonable than not that the insured would endeavor
to protect his or her life and health. Alternatively, the presumption is
based on the reasonable assumption that it is highly improbable that
an individual will intentionally take his or own life or inffict injury
upon himself or herself.95
Courts have found the presumption that individuals do not nor-
mally harbor a homicidal intent to outweigh evidence of suicide,
even if no evidence is offered in support of the presumption.
96
Washington and New York have established certain defini-
tional presumptions which distinguish between decisions involv-
ing a lethal prescription and other decisions involving the refusal
of life-sustaining care or the provision of pain relief measures.
Such presumptions illustrate that the states presume that indi-
viduals participating in the former measures are carrying out an
intent to hasten death, while persons participating in the latter
are presumed to be carrying out a nonlethal, legitimate intent.
92. Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273-76 (1952).
93. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523.
94. United States v. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978).
95. Gary Schuman, Suicide and the Life Insurance Contract: Was the Insured Sane
or Insane? That Is the Question - Or Is It?, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 745, 750-51 n.33 (1993).
96. See, e.g., Wyckoffv. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 147 P.2d 227 (Or.
1944). See also Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 169 U.S. 139 (1898)
(holding that courts should not presume parties intended to authorize by contract an indi-
vidual's suicide for purpose of obtaining insurance proceeds because such encouragement
endangers public interests and injuriously affects the public good).
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Notably, as long as the different presumptions are rebuttable,
they fall well within the states' authority to make public policy in
the medical treatment context.
In the context of this background, the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits clearly erred by ruling in essence that any distinctions
among acts with a death-hastening effect are irrational. Such
rulings expressly provided that the only defining element of such
acts is effect-based, as if an actual intent to die or hasten death is
not an element of the legal definition of assisted suicide and the
proof of such intent is irrelevant and unnecessary. The rulings
in fact ignore the possibility that an act having the effect of has-
tening death may or may not be accompanied by an intent to
hasten death, and that the presence or absence of such an intent
indeed alters the legal nature of the act as a matter of constitu-
tional law.
As the following section indicates, not only does "intent" mat-
ter under the Constitution with respect to assisted suicide, but a
particular kind of intent that goes beyond mere knowledge of a
death-hastening effect provides the essential element of any defi-
nition of this crime.
C. Distinctions Indicating the Presence or Absence of the
Suicide Victim's Purposeful Intent to Shorten Life Are
Necessary to the Definition of the Crime of Assisted
Suicide
1. Under the Constitution, Intent Is a Critical Element of the
Definition of Felonies
In the landmark decision of Morissette v. United States,97 the
Supreme Court ruled that while the federal judiciary lacks the
constitutional authority to create or define crimes, it may inter-
pret otherwise unclear provisions of a statute in light of "accumu-
lated ... legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice".9'
At issue in Morissette was whether an individual could be con-
victed of a particular federal offense without proof of criminal
intent given Congress' failure to expressly require criminal
intent to be included as an element of the offense in question.
The Court held that in light of "the ancient requirement of a
culpable state of mind",99 the "mere [legislative] omission . . . of
any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that
element from the crimes denounced." 100 The Court acknowl-
97. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
98. Id. at 263.
99. Id. at 250.
100. Id. at 263.
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edged a "century-old but accelerating tendency, discernible both
here and in England, to call into existence new duties and crimes
which disregard any ingredient of intent"101 but rejected it as a
guide for the interpretation of statutes codifying common law
felonies or "infamous" crimes. °2
With respect to such crimes, the Court provided the following:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as uni-
versal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of
the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal indi-
vidual to choose between good and evil.
103
The Court went on to say that, "in American law 'mens rea is
not so readily constituted from any wrongful act' as elsewhere"
10 4
in order "to protect those who were not blameworthy in mind
from conviction of infamous common-law crimes." 0 5 Any propo-
sal to eliminate intent as a necessary element of a crime would,
as a constitutional matter:
radically ... change the weights and balances in the scales of justice.
The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of
a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip
the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from inno-
cence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore
allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the
individual should not be extended to common-law crimes on judicial
initiative.1
0 6
Consequently, "the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is
firmly embedded" 10 7 and "offenses that require no mens rea gen-
erally are disfavored."108 Absent an express legislative decision
to eliminate intent as an element of a felony, none will be
inferred.
The Morissette line of precedent only indirectly applies to the
assisted suicide cases because most states, including Washington
101. Id. at 253.
102. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260-62. The Court differentiated felonies and infamous
crimes from what it called "public welfare offenses" which "do not fit neatly into any of
such accepted classifications of common-law offenses, such as those against the state, the
person, property, or public morals." Id. at 255. Public welfare offenses incur strict liabil-
ity and would not require proof of criminal intent because "[tihe accused, if he does not
will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society
might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one
who assumed his responsibilities." Id. at 256.
103. Id. at 250.
104. Id. at 252 n.9 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 252.
106. Id. at 263.
107. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
108. Id. (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
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and New York, have expressly designated the intent of the
accused as an element of assisted suicide.10 9 Thus, the need for
judicial interpretation is avoided. Moreover, the Ninth and Sec-
ond Circuits would eliminate intent as an element of assisted
suicide not to expand the scope of acts deemed criminal, but to
broaden the scope of acts deemed noncriminal.
Nevertheless, Morissette and its progeny are integral to the
assisted suicide definitional inquiry for several reasons. First,
these Supreme Court cases highlight the fallacy of the claim that
the distinction between intent and effect is constitutionally irrel-
evant when defining the crime of assisted suicide. Second, the
cases also help to properly focus the inquiry on the element of
intent and to move away from a simplistic equation of various
death-hastening decisions based solely on their shared effect
regardless of intent.
Finally, just as eliminating intent as a requisite criminal ele-
ment "radically change[s] the weights and balances in the scales
of justice" with respect to individual rights,"0 eliminating intent
as a factor for determining which acts are noncriminal would
upset the scales just as radically with respect to the community's
right to protect lives and maintain order. If some decisions hav-
ing the effect of hastening death are deemed noncriminal, then
all decisions with the same effect will have to be decriminalized
based solely on similarity in effect and irrespective of intent.
Ultimately, a community permitting some measures that indi-
rectly but not intentionally hasten death would be powerless to
prevent any form of homicide. This extreme shift in the balance
between individual and community rights heightens the consti-
tutional significance of intent in any definitional analysis of
assisted suicide.
2. What Is the Requisite Intent With Respect
to Assisted Suicide?
In United States v. Bailey,"' the Supreme Court recognized
that "[flew areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the
proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular
crime."12 The Court endorsed a definitional "hierarchy of culp-
able states of mind" which includes "purpose, knowledge, reck-
lessness, and negligence" and explained that "[p]erhaps the most
significant, and most esoteric, distinction drawn by this analysis
109. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
110. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.
111. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
112. Id. at 403.
222 Vol. 35:201
Is the Constitution a Suicide Pact?
is that between the mental states of 'purpose' and
'knowledge'."'13
The Court noted that while the purpose/knowledge distinction
is generally not important:
In certain narrow classes of crimes . . . heightened culpability has
been thought to merit special attention. Thus, the statutory and com-
mon law of homicide often distinguishes either in setting the "degree"
of the crime or in imposing punishment, between a person who knows
that another person will be killed as the result of his conduct and a
person who acts with the specific purpose of taking another's life.
114
The Court also adopted the following descriptions of purpose
and knowledge:
[A] person who causes a particular result is said to act purposely if
"'he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that
result happening from his conduct,'" while he is said to act knowingly
if he is aware "'that the result is practically certain to follow from his
conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.'"
15
Finally, the Bailey Court observed that the requisite level of
intent or state of mind must be determined for each act included
in an offense."1
6
What are the act-elements of assisted suicide and their corre-
sponding mental states? According to the New York Task Force
on Life and the Law, the elements of the crime of assisted suicide
would consist of "engaging in the conduct of causing or aiding
another person's suicide, and bringing about the result of achiev-
ing the other's death."" 7
113. Id. at 404.
114. Id. Recent criminal cases involving persons who know they have AIDS and
who are charged with attempted murder as a result of sexually assaulting another,
thereby exposing the victim to the risk of infection, highlight the critical distinction
between purpose and knowledge. See Sexual Assault: Knowledge of [AIDS] Infection
Insufficient Proof of Intent To Kill, Ares PoLicy & LAw, Aug. 23, 1996, at 3 (reporting
decision in Smallwood v. Maryland, No. 122 (Md. Aug. 1, 1996) which overturned convic-
tion for attempted murder of man with HIV who pleaded guilty to sexual assault, on
grounds that, in itself, evidence of his knowledge of his infectious condition was insuffi-
cient to prove a homicidal purpose; also noting that: "Had the court upheld Smallwood's
conviction anyone with HIV who engaged in unprotected sex could have faced charges of
attempted murder. Also, had the conviction been upheld, prosecutors in future cases
could have used charges of attempted murder as leverage to get defendants to accept plea
agreements for sex offenses").
115. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) (quoting W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRImNAL LAW
196'(1972)).
116. Id. at 406. (quoting the AMERIcAN LAw INSTrrUTE, MPC CoMMENTs 123. See
also Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1799 (1994) (providing: "different ele-
ments of the same offense can require different mental states") (citations omitted).
117. N. Y. STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 60.
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While Washington penalizes any individual who "knowingly
causes or aids another person to attempt suicide,""18 New York
penalizes any individual who "intentionally ... aids another per-
son to commit [or to attempt] suicide." 119 This indicates that the
requisite intent of the accused must be "knowing" in Washington
and "intentional" in New York.
Death, however, must be achieved or threatened as a result of
the victim's completed or attempted suicide. Thus, the victim's
state of mind will determine whether his or her death constitutes
a suicide that renders the "knowing" or "intentional" assistance
of the accused to be a crime.
20
The New York Task Force on Life and the Law defined suicide
as "the intentional taking of one's own life."' 2 ' Repealed penal
statutes in New York and Washington defined criminal suicide
and criminal attempted suicide in similar terms, as well as by
referring to "homicide."122 Furthermore, in New York, "inten-
tional" is defined by statute as referring to a "conscious objec-
tive," 23 which easily translates to the Supreme Court's definition
of "purpose" as "conscious desire." 24 Consequently, an individ-
ual accused of providing suicide assistance could not be convicted
of the specific crime of assisted suicide if the victim did not con-
sciously desire his or her life to be taken.
Proof of a victim's purposeful intent to take his or her own life
is indeed a key element of the legal definitions of suicide and
assisted suicide. Before the recent constitutional challenges
muddied the analysis, both sides of the debate were in substan-
tial agreement on this point.
For example, in a classic discussion of suicide and the refusal
of treatment, Robert Byrn observed that "[flrom the earliest
times, the law of suicide dealt with cases in which an individual
118. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060. (West 1988) (emphasis added).
119. N. Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.15(3) & 120.30 (McKinney 1987).
120. MEISEL, supra note 69, at 455 (providing: "Before there can be liability for
assisted suicide, the death of the patient must first be capable of being considered a sui-
cide."); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (Cal. App. 1983) (stating:
"Whether or not a homicide is punishable as a crime in the first instance, and the degree
of punishment which is imposed in the case of a criminal homicide depends upon the
mental culpability of the person causing the death")..
121. N. Y. TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 10.
122. See Marzen et al., supra note 1, at 206, 238. These criminal statutes defined
suicide as "the intentional taking of one's own life," and defined "attempted suicide" as
"any act dangerous to human life [committed] with intent to take [one's] own life" and
also provided that, "if committed upon or towards another person... would render the
perpetrator chargeable with homicide." Id.
123. N. Y. TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 60 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw § 15.15(1)
(McKinney 1987)) (noting: "A person is considered to act intentionally... 'when his con-
scious objective is to cause [a particular] result or to engage in [particular] conduct.").
124. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404.
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(felo de se) purposefully set in motion a death-producing agent
with the specific intent of effecting his own destruction or, at
least, serious injury. Suicide was malum in se, the equivalent of
murder." 125 Assisted suicide advocates Karen Lebacqz and H.
Tristram Engelhardt also concur that "acts of suicide . . . are
done with the express intent of ending one's life and not for some
other purpose. What makes an action 'suicide,' then, is the intent
of the actor. If it is done in order to kill oneself, it is suicide."
126
The victim's purpose rather than knowledge describes the req-
uisite intent for purposes of suicide. 27 Consequently, a state
may rationally distinguish between actions foreseeably resulting
in death by ascertaining whether the person committing such
actions harbored a lethal purpose for undertaking them. Clearly,
some actions would evidence a lethal purpose more than others,
irrespective of the fact that death or the risk of death is a known
consequence of all the actions in question. For example, a per-
son's request for a lethal dose of medication provides strong evi-
dence that the individual harbors the purposive intent to commit
suicide. 128 Yet, an individual's refusal of a respirator or other
125. Robert M. Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44
FoRDHAM L. REV. 1, 16 (1975), reprinted in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 706, 721 (Den-
nis J. Horan & David Mall eds. 1980). See also Robert L. Barry, BREAxING THE THREAD
OF LIFE: ON RATIONAL SUICIDE 1-18 (1994) (providing excellent survey of "narrow" and
"broad" definitions of suicide promoted at various points in history and advocating nar-
rower definition substantially similar to Byrn's); Velasquez, supra note 88 (same).
126. Karen Lebacqz & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Suicide, DEATH, DYING AND
EuTHANAsiA 699, 670 (Dennis J. Horan & David Mall eds. 1977). See also id. at 701 n.2
(quoting Immanuel Kant (1873)) (providing: "A man who shortens his life by intemper-
ance is guilty of imprudence and indirectly of his own death; but his guilt is not direct;...
we cannot say of him that he is a suicide. What constitutes suicide is the intention to
destroy oneself."); Id. at 670 (quoting E. KLUGE, THE PRACTICE OF DEATH (1975) ("A sui-
cidal act becomes suicide proper only when... 'the actor must engage in that action for
the express purpose of bringing about (her) own death").
127. Of course, as already discussed, this is not the only element. The intent of the
person providing "assistance" will also be important. Even if the assistant's intent falls
short of the requisite level, lesser crimes may still be implicated by proof of other levels of
a culpable state of mind, such as recklessness. See Norman L. Cantor & George C.
Thomas III, Pain Relief, Acceleration of Death, and Criminal Law, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETH-
ics J. 107 (1996).
128. A particular medication may have the legitimate effect of alleviating pain
within certain dosage limits, but if a physician administers the medication in a dosage
clearly exceeding the appropriate palliative limits and creating a high risk of accelerated
death, then a lethal purpose will be naturally inferred. In addition, if the physician
chooses a more risky method of alleviating pain when other less risky and equally effec-
tive methods are available, then "[b]y definition, the physician.., has chosen the less safe
alternative without a gain in pain relief. Indeed .... the physician's rejection of the safe
alternative might provide a prosecutor with evidence of a purpose to kill, rather than
comfort, the patient." Cantor & Thomas, supra note 127, at 117.
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forms of medical intervention may present "overwhelming diffi-
culties of proof' with respect to the existence of such a purpose. 129
The definitional analysis of assisted suicide adopted by the
Ninth and Second Circuits focuses solely on effect and knowl-
edge. These courts have thereby excluded the one element that
the Supreme Court regards as crucial to the definition of crimes.
Nothing in the Constitution or in the Supreme Court's rulings
supports such an analysis, nor mandates its application in
assisted suicide.
One final definitional issue of critical importance deals with
the claim that the crime of assisted suicide excludes the pur-
poseful taking of a life of an individual who is in the final stages
of death. The next section examines this issue from a historical
and constitutional perspective.
D. The Victim's Expected Lifespan Is Irrelevant to the
Definition of Assisted Suicide
In Compassion in Dying, the Ninth Circuit indicated that:
We are doubtful that deaths resulting from terminally ill patients
taking medication prescribed by their doctors should be classified as
"suicide.". . . We believe that there is a strong argument that a deci-
sion by a terminally ill patient to hasten by medical means a death
that is already in process, should not be classified as suicide.'
30
This mirrors the argument presented to the Ninth Circuit in one
of the amici briefs in the case:
Physician aid in dying is distinguishable from "suicide." Aid in dying
seeks to end the dying process. Unlike the traditional "suicide," the
person who seeks aid in dying does not have the primary goal of end-
ing his life. Given the terminal nature of his condition, the patient
wants to end his suffering by shortening the dying process. "In no
meaningful sense of the term can a choice to hasten one's own inevita-
ble death by the use of physician-prescribed medications be labeled a
'suicide,'... The terminally ill person who faces death is not 'commit-
ting suicide' by ending a life that is of indefinite duration."'
3 '
This definitional attack is not without precedent in American
case law. Defendants charged with murder or manslaughter
129. Byrn, supra note 125, at 728. See also Marzen et. al, supra note 1, at 12-13
(providing: "All else being equal, it ill behooves a non-totalitarian society to police
thoughts by inquiring into the motivations of all who choose a course which can be pur-
sued for either licit or illicit reasons. Moreover, in view of the vast number and almost
infinite variety of fact situations in which competent adults make choices concerning
medical treatment, it would be an administrative impossibility to regulate such choices.").
130. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 824.
131. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Americans for Death With Dignity and Euthanasia
Research & Guidance Organization at 4 n.6, Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-35534) (quoting Robert A Sedler, The Constitution and Has-
tening Inevitable Death, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 22).
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have raised the terminal condition of the victim as a defense in
several cases. Moreover, plaintiffs with terminal conditions
raised a similar argument in the Supreme Court case of United
States v. Rutherford,3 2 contending that federal laws banning the
interstate commerce of new drugs considered unsafe could not,
by definition, apply to the terminally ill. The next two sections
discuss these cases.
1. Murder/Manslaughter Cases
In what appears to be the first reported decision on the issue,
the California Supreme Court in 1874 denoted the argument
that "a defendant is not guilty of murder in the killing of a person
who has already been mortally wounded by another" as "a doc-
trine which cannot be seriously contended." 13 In 1912, the
Supreme Court of Kansas rejected a similar claim, holding that
irrespective of a victim's previous injuries caused by an earlier
attack, "it is sufficient to say that the [victim] was alive when
attacked with the corn knife .... Even if the previous wounds
were mortal, of which there was no proof, death was hastened by
the new assault, which is sufficient to sustain the charge [of
murder] ."134
In 1929, the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the con-
viction of a defendant charged with murder as a result of his
involvement in a gang attack upon a police officer. The defend-
ant claimed that the injuries for which he was responsible would
not have caused the officer's death but for the mortal wounds
inflicted by another attacker. The court rejected this claim in
terms that have since come to describe the black letter law:
But though a human body must be alive in order that it may be the
subject of homicide, yet the quantity of vitality which it retains at the
moment the fatal blow is given, and the length of time life would
otherwise have continued, are immaterial considerations. If any life
at all is left in the human body, even the least spark, the extinguish-
ment of it is as much homicide as the killing of the most vital being.
135
132. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
133. People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61, 64 (1874) (also listing the following headnote:
"What Constitutes Murder. - A person is not guiltless of murder because the one he kills
has already been mortally wounded").
134. State v. Olsen, 127 P. 625, 628 (Kan. 1912).
135. State v. Francis, 149 S.E. 348, 364 (S.C. 1929). See also State v. Sala, 169 P.2d
524, 534 (Nev. 1946) overruled 634 P.2d 1226 (1981) (quoting same language); 40 AM.
JUR. 2D Homicide § 16 (1968) (providing: "The law declares that one who inflicts an
injury on another and thereby accelerates his death shall be held criminally responsible
therefor. It is said in this connection that if any life at all is left in a human body, even
the least spark, the extinguishment of it is as much homicide as the killing of the most
vital being."); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 8 (1991) (noting: "The vitality which the victim pos-
sessed at the moment of accused's act and the fact that he would have lived for only a
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Courts have also considered and rejected claims that the vic-
tim's underlying illness and resulting natural proximity to
death, as opposed to injuries caused by preceding criminal acts,
prevented a charge of murder. For example, in People v.
Moan,1"' the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:
The claim on the part of the defendant is that it was not the injury but
chronic alcoholism that caused the [victim Finck's] death. There was
some conflict in the evidence on this point; that the organs of the
deceased, including brain, stomach, kidneys, and liver, were in a very
unhealthy condition, clearly appears from the evidence, but that the
immediate cause of death was the blow or blows is abundantly
established.
A question is made on that portion of the charge to the jury
instructing them that if the blows accelerated the death of Finck,
defendant was responsible. Such we understand to be the law of
homicide. If a patient is lying in the last stages of consumption, with
a tenure upon life that cannot possibly continue for a day, it is homi-
cide to administer a poison to him by which his life is ended almost
immediately. So, in the case we are now considering, if Finck, by
excess in indulgence in alcoholic drinks had reduced himself to a
wreck, and brought his life to the verge of the grave, it was a wrongful
act for the defendant to accelerate his death by violence. Perhaps
blows, delivered with equal force on the head of a strong man in the
enjoyment of robust health, would not have been attended by any
serious consequences; but upon a life impaired as Finck's was, by self-
abuse, they may have accelerated his death; and but for the blows the
man would not have died - at least not at the time he did. This
makes the defendant criminally responsible. 137
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Iowa in 1887 upheld a murder
conviction in State v. Smith 138 after stating the following:
It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that... there might have
been three causes contributing to the death of the deceased: (1) heart
disease, a natural cause; (2) intoxication and exposure to cold caused
by it; and (3) the wounds inflicted by the defendant; and the argument
is that, where there are three causes which may have contributed to
produce death, one natural cause and two artificial causes, a charge
that death proceeded from one artificial cause, and the proof is that it
was only accelerated by that cause, but in fact proceeded from the
other artificial cause, the evidence does not support the charge. ...
In our opinion, the instructions complained of are correct. It surely
ought not to be the law that because a person is afflicted with a mortal
malady, from which he must soon die, whether his ailment be caused
by natural or artificial causes, another may be excused for acts of vio-
lence which hasten or contribute to or cause death sooner than it
short time in any event, are immaterial considerations; if any life at all was left the extin-
guishment of it is homicide").
136. 4 P. 545 (Cal. 1884).
137. Id. at 548-49.
138. 34 N.W. 597 (Iowa 1887).
Is the Constitution a Suicide Pact?
would otherwise occur. Life at best is but of short duration, and one
who causes death ought not to be excused for his act because his vic-
tim was soon to die from other causes, whatever they may be, and in
the case at bar we think the jury were warranted in finding that the
violence of the defendant contributed to or caused or accelerated the
death of his wife.
139
Consistent with these precedents, the Michigan Supreme Court
in People v. Kevorkian'40 concluded that "the temporal proximity
of death is irrelevant" to the definition of assisted suicide,14 ' and
"the inevitability of death adds nothing to the constitutional
analysis."42
If the United States Supreme Court were to adopt the contrary
position and hold as a matter of constitutional law that a victim's
proximity to death is relevant to the culpability of an individual
charged with assisting suicide, then the definitional ramifica-
tions would be far-reaching. As a form of homicide, assisted sui-
cide cannot be distinguished from other forms of homicide. If the
victim's condition is deemed relevant in the assisted suicide con-
text, then it must also be relevant in any case of homicide. As a
result, potentially any defendant accused of a homicidal act
would have the constitutional right to raise the victim's debili-
tated condition as a defense.
Moreover, if the victim's proximity to death is relevant to the
culpability of an individual charged with assisting suicide, then
all crimes against life would potentially be limited to those life-
139. Id. at 601-02. Accord State v. O'Brien, 46 N.W. 752, 753 (Iowa 1890) (noting:
"It is suggested that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, and that it is not shown
that the death of Stocum resulted from injuries inflicted by defendant. The evidence
shows that decedent had not been in good health for several months.... The fact that he
was afflicted with a disease which might have proved fatal would not justify the wrongful
acts of defendant, nor constitute a defense in law."); Gardner v. State, 73 S.W. 13, 14 (Tex.
1903) (stating: "If deceased would have shortly died from Bright's disease, and it was an
incurable malady, yet if appellant's shot assisted in bringing about the death, he would be
guilty of the homicide. An accused cannot speculate as to how long his victim may live
with an incurable malady when he inflicts a shot or a wound that hastens the death or
the action of the fatal disease."); State v. Mally, 366 P.2d 868, 873-74 (Mont. 1961) (hold-
ing that husband's failure to find medical help for seriously ill spouse who was unable to
seek help herself, and who never "consciously or rationally denied medical aid," consti-
tuted involuntary manslaughter because "[tihough a person may be at the threshold of
death, if the spark of life is extinguished by a wrongful act, it is sufficient for a convic-
tion"); People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (Cal. App. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819
(1970) (upholding felony-murder conviction for death of robbery victim who "Was an
obese, sixty-year-old man" with "an advanced case of atherosclerosis, a progressive and
ultimately fatal disease," and who died of a fatal seizure precipitated by the robbery. The
court concluded that "[s]o long as life is shortened as a result of the felonious act, it does
not matter that the victim might have died soon anyway... [because] the robber takes
his victim as he finds him").
140. 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
141. Id. at 725 n.27.
142. Id. at 727-28 n.41.
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threatening acts which imperil the healthy. Those charged with
mortally attacking an individual deemed to be in the "process of
dying" would avoid conviction. As the "process of dying" is an
inherently expansive concept in that all persons will ultimately
die, even though many die sooner than expected, the courts will
be swamped with defendants' claims of a constitutional right to
the "proximity to death" defense in a host of cases.
For example, such a defense will be available when a victim is
seriously wounded by the defendant's partner in crime, when a
victim has any type of condition rendering him or her more vul-
nerable to violence of any sort, and even when the victim is a
member of a class of persons who on average will die sooner than
the rest of the population. Accordingly, the defense may even
pertain to crimes against persons in dangerous inner city neigh-
borhoods or in risky occupations such as the military, police or
firefighting, because on average such persons will die sooner
than persons in the suburbs or in low risk jobs.
In addition, a "proximity to death" defense will have to be rec-
ognized as a matter of constitutional law when determining the
scope of any state policy designed to protect life. Such policies by
definition would apply only to the healthy in low risk circum-
stances. Those individuals expected to die soon would fall
outside of the law's protection.
Importantly, the Supreme Court has rejected the contention
that the terminally ill, because of their proximity to death, are
not properly subject to the protections of the law. The next sec-
tion discusses this ruling and its implications in the debate over
the definition of assisted suicide.
1. United States v. Rutherford
In 1975, various cancer patients sued the Federal Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") in federal court, seeking to enjoin
the FDA from restricting the interstate shipment and sale of
Laetrile. The complaint alleged that the drug could potentially
cure cancer, and that therefore terminally ill persons should be
given access to the drug even though the FDA had not proved it
to be safe or effective and the medical profession generally
opposed the use of the drug. The patients specifically argued
that the FDA restriction interfered with their constitutional
right to privacy, which encompassed the right to choose even
potentially unsafe and ineffective drugs in an attempt to cure
their cancer. 143
143. See infra notes 243-259 and accompanying text for discussion on the constitu-
tional claim.
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While the federal district court recognized this constitutional
claim,144 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to address
it by ruling instead that the federal statute governing the regula-
tion of unsafe drugs had no reasonable application to persons
with terminal conditions. 145 The court stated that, "since those
patients by definition would die of cancer regardless of what may
be done," there were no realistic standards against which to mea-
sure the safety and effectiveness of a drug for that class of indi-
viduals."146 The FDA appealed the case to the Supreme Court,
which unanimously reversed the rulings of the federal district
and Tenth Circuit courts.
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall observed that: 1) the
federal statute "makes no special provision for drugs used to
treat terminally ill patients;147 2) nothing in the legislative his-
tory "suggests that Congress intended to protect only those per-
sons suffering from curable diseases";14 and 3) those charged
with the statute's enforcement "never made exceptions for drugs
used by the terminally ill."
49
The Court refused to read into the statute an implied excep-
tion governing ineffective or unsafe drugs on the following
grounds:
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' apparent assumption, effectiveness
does not necessarily denote capacity to cure. In the treatment of any
illness, terminal or otherwise, a drug is effective if it fulfills, by objec-
tive indices, its sponsor's claims of prolonged life, improved physical
condition, or reduced pain.
So too, the concept of safety under [the statute] is not without
meaning for terminal patients. Few if any drugs are completely safe
in the sense that they may be taken by all persons in all circum-
stances without risk .... For the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a
drug is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is
not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit. Indeed, the Court
of Appeals implicitly acknowledged that safety considerations have
144. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1298-1301 (W. D. Okla. 1977),
rev'd 616 F.2d 455 (1980).
145. At issue was the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 201, 355.
146. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979) (quoting Rutherford v.
United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 1978)). The district court registered an
opinion in even stronger terms:
Defendants assert that early diagnosis and prompt treatment are critical in the
management of cancer and that needless and untimely deaths will occur if laetrile
is used in preference to established methods of cancer treatment. Such arguments
have little applicability to that fraction of cancer patients whose lives orthodox
medical science professes no capacity to preserve. To speak of laetrile as being
"unsafe" for these people is bizarre.
Rutherford v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 506, 509 (W. D. Okla. 1977).
147. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 551.
148. Id. at 552.
149. Id. at 553.
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relevance for terminal cancer patients by restricting authorized use of
Laetrile to intravenous injections for persons under a doctor's
supervision. 15
0
Moreover, the Court found several problems with limiting such
an exception to the terminally ill. First, the Court provided that,
"if an individual suffering from a potentially fatal disease rejects
conventional therapy in favor of a drug with no demonstrable
curative properties, the consequences can be irreversible."' 5 '
Second, the Court noted that, "it is often impossible to identify a
patient as terminally ill except in retrospect .... Even critically
ill individuals may have unexpected remissions and may respond
to conventional treatment." 15 2 Third, the Court found that, "[t]o
accept the proposition that the safety and efficacy standards of
the Act have no relevance for terminal patients is to deny the
[FDA's] authority over all drugs, however toxic or ineffectual, for
such individuals."153 Fourth, as demonstrated by the historical
record, the Court concluded that terminally ill individuals in
desperation are particularly vulnerable to "resourceful entrepre-
neurs" pedalling all sorts of purported cures. Accordingly, "this
historical experience" amply demonstrated "why Congress could
reasonably have determined to protect the terminally ill, no less
than other patients, from the vast range of self-styled panaceas
that inventive minds can devise. " "'
In light of these foregoing considerations, the Court rejected
the decision of the district court to carve an exception for the ter-
minally ill into the applicable statute, stating:
Under our constitutional framework, federal courts do not sit as coun-
cils of revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord with their
own conceptions of prudent public policy.... Only when a literal con-
struction of a statute yields results so manifestly unreasonable that
they could not fairly be attributed to congressional design will an
exception to statutory language be judicially implied.... Here, how-
ever, we have no license to depart from the plain language of the Act,
for Congress could reasonably have intended to shield terminal
patients from ineffectual or unsafe drugs .... Whether, as a policy
150. Id. at 555-566. According to the Supreme Court, the unlimited use of Laetrile
was presumably based on evidence that the drug was toxic when orally administered. Id.
at 551.
151. Id. at 556.
152. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 556-57. The Court quoted from testimony in the record
indicating that "Itihe distinction of 'terminal' patients may not be reliably determined
and an assumption that Laetrile may be given to ['terminal'] patients with impunity may
deprive such patients of therapeutic measures which could help them." Id. at 556 n.14.
153. Id. at 557-58.
154. Id. at 558.
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matter, an exemption should be created is a question for legislative
judgment, not judicial inference.' 55
Rutherford poses a significant obstacle to any definitional
analysis which takes into account the victim's proximity to
death. Certainly if providing a potentially cancer-curing, albeit
risky drug to terminally ill individuals seeking to prolong their
lives 156 is deemed to be a reasonable harm which Congress
sought to eliminate by enacting food and drug safety laws, then it
is equally if not more reasonable for the states to include the kill-
ing of the terminally ill within their definition of the crime of
assisted suicide. The parallels between the two cases cannot be
ignored.
157
Thus, states could rely on Rutherford as a basis for asserting
that: 1) the killing of terminally ill individuals represents a
threat to life regardless of the individual's proximity to death
because all lives are in the process of dying; 2) lethal drugs or
drugs ingested in lethal quantities are as unsafe for the termi-
nally ill as for anyone else because the drugs will inflict death
without any therapeutic benefit; 3) deaths caused by lethal drugs
are irreversible while the diagnosis of having a terminal condi-
tion is not, thus not all persons diagnosed as being terminally ill
will actually be in the process of dying but instead some
155. Id. at 555, 559. The Court noted that at the time it rendered its decision, at
least seventeen states had enacted laws permitting the intrastate, as opposed to inter-
state, commerce of Laetrile. Id. at 554 n.10. Significantly, a survey of such laws reveals
that no law recognizes a "terminal condition" exemption by limiting the use of Laetrile to
patients in the terminal stages of cancer. Instead, each law authorizes any person to
receive the drug pursuant to a physician's order. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 08.64.367
(1991); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2451 to 2453 (1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-30-
113(4) (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4901-4905 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 395.066 (West 1979) (repealed); IDAHO CODE § 18-7301A (1987); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 56-1i
2, para. 1801 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (repealed); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-42-23-1 to -8 (Burns
1993) (repealed); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6b01 (1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:676 (West
1992); MD. CODE ANN. [HEALTH-GEN.] § 18-302 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-41-101 to -
107 (1995); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 585.495, 633.521, 639.2804 (Michie 1996); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 329.20 (1979) (repealed); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:6F-1 to 5 (West Supp. 1996);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-23.1-01 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2-313.1 to -313.6 (West
1984) (repealed); OR. REv. STAT. § 689.535(2) (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34.14A-1
(1979) (repealed); TEx. [HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE ANN. §§ 439.001-.017 (West 1992);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.54.130-.150 (West 1992).
156. One court found that '[sluch a decision is by no means necessarily indicative of
suicidal tendencies" and "that in some instances at least.., cancer victims [untreated by
conventional medical means] outlive treated ones."Rutherford, 438 F. Supp. at 1299 n.25.
157. At least one commentator has already noted the similarities between a case
involving a competent terminally ill patient seeking access to physician-dispensed Lae-
trile and a case involving a terminally ill patient seeking access to a physician-dispensed
lethal overdose. Comment, Laetrile: Statutory and Constitutional Limitations on the
Regulation of Ineffective Drugs, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 233, 256-57 (1978) (recognizing that
the Laetrile cases challenge the "state's power to control... self-destructive conduct, such
as suicide").
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nonterminally ill persons will also be mistakenly included in that
category; 4) to accept the proposition that states have no author-
ity to include deaths of the terminally ill within the definition of
assisted suicide is to deny the states any authority to protect the
terminally ill against any harm whatsoever; and 5) the termi-
nally ill are vulnerable not only to the vast range of purported
life-extending but risky cures "that inventive minds can devise,"
but are also particularly vulnerable to suggestions that perhaps
they are better off dead than dying.
E. Summary of Definitional Analysis
The foregoing analysis places the assisted suicide issue in a
proper context by examining the definitions of relevant terms not
from a philosophical perspective, but a constitutional perspec-
tive. Although the Ninth and Second Circuits have adopted cer-
tain philosophical premises that disagree with those relied upon
by the states, the courts failed to tie their definitional opinions to
any constitutional provision or Supreme Court precedent. Thus,
the Ninth and Second Circuits intruded upon the states' right to
define crimes without sufficient constitutional justification.
158
The debate over the definition of assisted suicide forms in cru-
cial ways the substantive analysis necessary to resolving
whether assisted suicide is constitutionally protected. Clearly,
an understanding of what the states are preventing when they
legislate against assisted suicide will assist the inquiry into the
nature of the constitutional right being asserted.
III. DOES THE CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZE A RIGHT
TO ASSISTED SUICIDE?
The Ninth and Second Circuits have concluded that assisted
suicide is merely a cousin of other constitutionally protected
interests. Each Circuit based this conclusion on two premises:
1) in protecting a right to refuse treatment or to receive pain
relief in circumstances where death may thereby be hastened,
either the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
common and statutory law of the states recognize a right to pur-
158. According to the Supreme Court,
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress
have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the ten-
sion between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral,
philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment
has always been thought to be the province of the States.
Montana v. Egelhoff, 64 U.S.L.W. 4500, 4505 (U.S. June 13, 1996) (No. 95-566) (quoting
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (plurality opinion)).
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posely hasten death;5 9 and 2) the interest at stake in an assisted
suicide case involves an "important" and "intimate" choice which
per se warrants constitutional protection. 160 Importantly, both
Circuits employed a constitutional analysis that deemphasized
the historical status of assisted suicide and focused on what the
Ninth Circuit has claimed is a "rational continuum" between the
asserted interest in assisted suicide and other recognized inter-
ests. 161 In doing so, the Circuits subscribed to an approach touted
by Justice Brennan in Michael H. v. Gerald D. "2 as the "better"
alternative to a strictly historical analysis:
[T]o describe the issue in this case as whether the relationship
existing between Michael and Victoria "has been treated as a pro-
tected family unit under the historic practices of our society, or
whether on any other basis it has been accorded special protection" is
to reinvent the wheel. The better approach - indeed, the one com-
manded by our prior cases and by common sense - is to ask whether
the specific parent-child relationship under consideration is close
enough to the interests that we already have protected to be deemed
an aspect of "liberty" as well.
163
The Michael H. case is revealing for several reasons. A plural-
ity of the Court in the case (consisting of Justices Scalia, Rehn-
quist, O'Connor and Kennedy) concluded that history and
tradition provided sufficient bases for rejecting the liberty claim
before the Court. Thus, according to the plurality, a biological
father lacked a cognizable liberty interest in seeking visitation
rights to a child whom he acknowledged was his, but whose
mother was married to another man both at the time the child
was conceived and at the time the biological father sought visita-
tion rights.'
159. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790 (referring numerous times to purported lib-
erty interest in choosing the manner and timing of death necessary for carrying out the
"wish to hasten death"); Quill, 80 F.3d at 727 (recognizing a purported state-created
"right... to hasten death upon proper proof of [the] desire to do so").
160. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813 (holding that a "common thread" in cases
recognizing liberty interests "is that they involve decisions that are highly personal and
intimate, as well as of great importance to the individual"); Id. at 850 (Beezer, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that nonfundamental "liberty protects not only choices that are personal,
intimate, and central to autonomy, but also that are central to personal dignity"); Quill,
80 F.3d at 730 (referring to "right to define [one's] own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life") (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)); Id. at 741 (Calabresi, J., concurring in result) (referring to
interest in determining "crucial life and death choices").
161. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 800 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
162. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
163. Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 127.
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Of particular interest in the Michael H. case is the plurality's
refusal to acknowledge a "rational continuum" between the
rights of biological fathers recognized in prior cases, and the
interest asserted by the biological father in Michael H. A concur-
ring opinion by Justice Stevens and the dissenting opinions of
Justices Brennan and White (joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun) contended that the principles enunciated in the prior
cases provided an inexorable basis for extending constitutional
protection to the father's claim in that case.
16 5
The plurality disagreed and pointed to what it considered to be
a critical distinction between the Michael H. case and prior
cases. In the Michael H. case, the child was already a member of
a "unitary" family involving the child's mother and her husband.
Both the mother and her husband were willing to provide for the
child, whereas in prior cases the child's mother was unmarried.
The Court found that this distinctive fact situation created a con-
flict of interest between the child's biological father and the wife's
husband, who also desired to maintain a parental relationship
consistent with the marital relationship. 6 6 Pursuant to this con-
flict, the plurality asserted that the Constitution did not preclude
the states from choosing against "an adulterous natural father"
in favor of "a marital father.
" 167
The Michael H. case is highly relevant to the assisted suicide
cases currently before the Supreme Court. While the dissenters
in Michael H. have since left the Court, Justice Stevens remains
and the issue is whether the new members of the Court will fol-
low the "historical approach" or the "rational continuum
approach." Further, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have
expressed their discomfort with applying a purely historical
analysis in all cases and have endorsed the "rational continuum"
analysis in other contexts. 6 ' Thus the question of whether
165. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that he "would
not foreclose the possibility that a constitutionally protected relationship" existed in this
case but finding that denial of visitation rights was justified on other grounds); Id. at 142-
43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that "these cases have produced a unifying
theme: although an unwed father's biological link to his child does not, in and of itself,
guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with that child, such a link com-
bined with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so"); Id. at 157-58 (White, J.,
dissenting) (contending that "[t]he basic principle enunciated in the Court's unwed father
cases is that an unwed father who has demonstrated a sufficient commitment to his
paternity by way of personal, financial, or custodial responsibilities has a protected lib-
erty interest in a relationship with his child").
166. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion).
167. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130.
168. See id. at 132 (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring) (indicating the desire not
to "foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analy-
sis" and citing to Justice Harlan's reference to liberty as a "rational continuum" in Poe v.
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assisted suicide is constitutionally protected may turn on
whether a majority of the Court recognizes a constitutionally rel-
evant distinction between assisted suicide and other rights cur-
rently protected.
Consequently, while a critique of the lower court rulings based
on historical practices within the states will be necessary, stand-
ing alone this critique may not be sufficiently persuasive to the
Court. In addition, the mere assertion that the Court previously
declined to recognize fundamental rights beyond marriage, pro-
creation, education, etc., fails to account for the possibility that
in certain cases, a majority of the Court may be inclined to
expand the scope of prior Supreme Court decisions. To uphold
laws banning assisted suicide, the Court will have to be per-
suaded that constitutionally significant distinctions lie between
assisted suicide and other constitutionally cognizable interests
(whether fundamental or "non-fundamental). 16 9 The following
two sections examine the claim that a rational continuum partic-
ularly exists between assisted suicide and medical decisionmak-
ing, and generally exists between other protected interests of an
important and personal nature.
A. Is There a Rational Continuum Between Assisted Suicide
and Medical Decisionmaking?
In essence, the Ninth and Second Circuits have contended that
physician-assisted suicide, which incorporates the purposive
intent to hasten death, is "close enough" 7 ° to medical decisions
having the effect or creating the risk of hastening death as to
deserve the same constitutional protection. For example, the
Ninth Circuit characterized the interest at stake in assisted sui-
cide cases in terms of the "end and not the means" of assisted
suicide. 171 The court reasoned that if the end of other constitu-
tionally cognizable interests is the fulfillment of an individual's
death wish, then an interest in physician-prescribed lethal over-
doses should be recognized as well, even though the means of
carrying out an individual's wish to die differs from other forms
of hastened death. 72 Prior Supreme Court decisions recognizing
an individual's interest in rejecting or accepting medical treat-
ment, however, omit any reference to hastened death as an objec-
UlIlman); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (citing to
Harlan's dissent as a basis for finding abortion to be a protected liberty).
169. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 850 (rejecting claim of "fundamental"
right to assisted suicide but recognizing "nonfundamental" right).
170. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




tive, and refer to the risk of death only when describing the
limits of such interests.
For example, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,73 the Supreme Court characterized the right of an indi-
vidual to refuse treatment as an interest in avoiding bodily intru-
sions. 174 Nowhere did the majority of the Court in that case refer
to death as the objective of exercising this interest. If death was
an essential objective of the individual, then presumably the
interest would be cognizable only in circumstances where the
individual's death would result from the removal of care.
Clearly, this is not the case. Such an interest is cognizable even
in circumstances where death is not at issue. 7 5 If the refusal
implicates "dramatic consequences" such as death, however, then
this will "inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of that
interest is constitutionally permissible," 76 and thereby provides
the potential basis for limiting its exercise.
Moreover, in Whalen v. Roe 77 the Supreme Court recognized
"the right to decide independently, with the advice of [a] physi-
cian, to acquire and to use needed medication." 7 8 Yet the Court
found that such a right is limited by the states' unquestioned
authority to "prohibit entirely the use of particular [dangerous]
drugs." Additionally, the Court found that the right is limited by
the states' power to impose dosage limits on the use of otherwise
legitimate drugs, particularly to minimize the risk of injury or
death to an individual caused by the ingestion of unsafe
173. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
174. The majority opinion in Cruzan referred to '[the] notion of bodily integrity",
'battery", 'assault", "bodily invasion", "avoiding the unwanted administration [of drugs]",
"the forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body", and 'the forced
administration of life-sustaining medical treatment" as critical elements of an interest in
refusing treatment. Id. at 278-79. Concurring, Justice O'Connor identified similar fac-
tors: The liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions involving
the State's invasions into the body"; it implicates 'state incursions into the body"; "impo-
sition of medical treatment... necessarily involves some form of restraint and intrusion";
a person undergoing unwanted treatment may feel like a 'captive of the machinery"; and
feeding tubes "involve some degree of intrusion and restraint". Id. at 287-89 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Even Justice Brennan in a dissent characterized the interest in similar
terms: 'The right to be free from unwanted medical attention is a right to evaluate the
potential benefit of treatment and its possible consequences according to one's own values
and to make a personal decision whether to subject oneself to the intrusion." Id. at 309
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 278 (referring to Supreme Court cases recognizing the right of an
individual to refuse the intrusive administration of antipsychotic medication and behav-
ior modification treatment).
176. Id. at 279.
177. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
178. Id. at 603.
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amounts. 79 Far from being the goal of an interest in medical
decisionmaking, the risk of injury or death instead provides the
very basis for narrowing the interest.
In actuality, assisted suicide is no closer in nature to an indi-
vidual's refusal of medical treatment or acceptance of pain relief
than it is to other constitutional interests that in some cases may
knowingly, but not purposely, risk death. For example, the right
to free speech may knowingly lead to hastened death when it is
exercised by a politically unpopular minority group in a socially
volatile situation. Additionally, other rights such as the right to
vote (when exercised in the midst of a community's vehement
hostility towards the voter), the right to travel (when exercised
by freedom riders journeying through a racially polarized dis-
trict), or the right to an education (when exercised by minorities
seeking access to a racially segregated school), may also impli-
cate the same grave risks. s0
Under the reasoning of the Ninth and Second Circuits, the
rights discussed above and others would have to be equated to
assisted suicide because in certain situations exercise of these
rights may have the same effect. Given the foreseeability of
death caused by exercising a constitutional freedom in highly
charged circumstances, one would have to impute a desire to die
to a desire to speak, vote, travel and receive an education in vola-
tile situations. This demonstrates the absurdity of such reason-
ing, and disproves the existence of any "rational continuum"
between an interest having as its objective the taking of life and
other interests that may on occasion create the risk of death but
nevertheless lack a lethal purpose.
179. Id. See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954) ( holding that
"It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce standards of con-
duct within its borders relative to the health of everyone there .... The state's discretion
in that field extends naturally to the regulation of all professions concerned with
health."); Minnesota ex. rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921) (noting: "There
can be no question of the authority of the state in the exercise of its police power to regu-
late the administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous and habit-forming
drugs..."); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962) (providing: "A state might
impose criminal sanctions, for example, against the unauthorized manufacture, prescrip-
tion, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics with its borders."); Rutherford v. United
States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980) (asserting: "It
is apparent in the context with which we are here concerned that the decision by the
patient whether to have a treatment or not is a protected right, but his selection of a
particular treatment, or at least a medication, is within the area of governmental interest
in protecting public health").
180. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (providing: "Some
cost will be paid by anyone who approves or implements a constitutional decision where it
is unpopular, or who refuses to work to undermine the decision or to force its reversal.
The price may be criticism or ostracism, or it may be violence").
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B. Unlike Any Other Constitutionally Protected Decision
Deemed "Intimate" or "Important" to an Individual,
Assisted Suicide Purposely Expels the Victim
Irretrievably From Society and Thus Lacks Any
Conceivable Connection. to the Purposes and Privileges of
Constitutional Citizenship
Both the Ninth and Second Circuits referred to the Supreme
Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey... in support of their contention that assisted
suicide must be constitutionally recognized because of its impor-
tance to an individual's assessment of the concept of existence." 2
Undoubtedly, the decision to take one's own life implicates
important personal concerns and, on that basis alone, might be
considered identical in nature to other important personal inter-
ests already recognized under the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has not, however, extended protection to every interest
deemed to be intimate and personal, suggesting that these char-
acteristics may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for con-
stitutional recognition. For example, Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter intimated in Casey that had the abortion
issue come before them initially, they may have refused to recog-
nize abortion as a protected liberty interest, notwithstanding its
personal and intimate nature.lm8 Yet any apparent reservations
these Justices might have had in reaffirming the constitutional
status of abortion were overcome as they recognized that women
had come to rely upon abortion not just as a means of avoiding
the "suffering" of childbirth and motherhood, but also as a means
of determining their "place in society."" 4 According to the Jus-
tices, they could not:
[R]efuse to face the fact that for two decades of economic and social
developments, people have organized intimate relationships and
made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in
society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally
in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by
their ability to control their reproductive lives.18
5
181. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
182. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 801; Quill, 80 F.3d at 730.
183. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853, 851.
184. Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 856 (emphasis added); see also id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (providing: "Because
motherhood has a dramatic impact on a woman's educational prospects, employment
opportunities, and self-determination, restrictive abortion laws deprive her of basic con-
trol over her life.").
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Unlike abortion, assisted suicide lacks any connection to an
individual's ability to participate in society. Instead, assisted
suicide purposefully extinguishes life and thereby prevents an
individual from subsequently engaging in any economic or social
endeavors. Assisted suicide is an attack on life rather than a
way of life. In this critical respect assisted suicide differs from all
other interests recognized as constitutional rights. As a result,
no constitutional purpose is served by recognizing an interest so
profoundly antisocial and nihilistic in character.
The following discussion asserts that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment recognizes only those interests deemed important to the
enjoyment of life within society, regardless of their importance
from an individual's perspective. Constitutional freedoms thus
enhance individual existence and provide an opportunity to par-
ticipate within society. Constitutional freedoms have nothing to
do with an individual's purposeful expulsion by death from all
social interaction whatsoever.
1. The Constitution Looks to the Nexus Between the Asserted
Interest and the Freedom to Participate in Society, and Not
Solely to the Interest's Importance to an Individual
The Supreme Court has "reject[ed] at the outset the notion
that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is suffi-
cient to invoke the ... protections of the Due Process Clause.
" 186
Regardless of "the 'weight' of the individual's interest" (its impor-
tance to the individual), its cognizability as a protected liberty
will depend on its "nature;" that is, its relation to the "'whole
domain of social and economic fact'."187 Thus, no matter how
important an interest is to an individual, it will not be recognized
under the Fourteenth Amendment unless it facilitates the indi-
vidual's ability to "'engage in any of the common occupations of
life'." 88
186. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
187. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (quoting National Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see
also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 840-41
(1977); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
188. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923)). In Roth, the Supreme Court observed that "[u]ndeniably, the respondent's re-
employment prospects were of major concern to him - concern that we surely cannot say
was insignificant." Id. at 570. Nevertheless, the "interest in holding a teaching job at a
state university, simpliciter" (Id. at 575 n.14) did not rise to the level of a constitutional
right when an individual "simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to
seek another." Id. at 575. Similarly, in Smith, the Supreme Court held that a child's
interest in avoiding "grievous loss" from the "disruption of stable relationships" with the
child's foster family "does not, in and of itself, implicate the due process guarantee."
Smith, 431 U.S. at 840. The Court declined to resolve the question of whether the child's
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For example, the Court found in Morrissey v. Brewer8 9 that a
parolee's interest in parole was constitutionally cognizable
because:
[It] enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have
never been convicted of any crime. The parolee has been released
from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise
of being able to return to society and function as a responsible, self-
reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gain-
fully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form
the other enduring attachments to normal life....
We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although indetermi-
nate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its
termination inflicts a "grievous loss" on the parolee and often on
others..
. .[Thus] the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9°
Consequently, regardless of whatever interest in death an
individual may assert in the face of pain and suffering, its impor-
tance to the individual would not, under the Court's traditional
analysis, guarantee its protection as a constitutional right. An
interest must be connected in some way to constitutional pur-
poses having everything to do with life and little, if anything, to
do with death. 19'
2. The "Right to Be Let Alone" "Autonomy" and "Free Choice"
Must Also Be Understood in Reference to Life and
Social Opportunity, Not Death
The Ninth Circuit asserted in Compassion in Dying that its
"profound respect" for "the right to be let alone," a "noble objec-
tive" of the Constitution, led it to recognize assisted suicide as a
protected interest. 92 Similarly, the Second Circuit claimed in
interests were constitutionally cognizable after deciding the case on other grounds, but
did note that "[wihatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an
institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal
from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents." Id. at 846-47.
189. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
190. Id. at 482 (emphasis added). Cf Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25
(1976) (noting that where prisoner's asserted interest in residing in prison facility with
more favorable conditions bears no relation to interest in societal participation of the
same nature as parole, and transfer to facility with less favorable conditions is within the
normal range of custody authorized by the prisoner's conviction, then the fact that "life in
one prison is much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify that a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated").
191. See, e.g., Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and "Liberty": Their Original Meaning, His-
torical Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate Over Abortion Rights, 78
M'N. L. REv. 585 (1994) (arguing on historical grounds that constitutional references to
"liberty" must be interpreted according to their relation to "life").
192. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 800 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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Quill that New York case law recognized a "right to bring on
death" supposedly based on "'our system of free government [that
cherishes] notions of individual autonomy and free choice'" and
that affords "'the greatest possible protection [to one's] autonomy
and freedom from unwanted interference with the furtherance of
[one's] own desires'." 93 Thus these courts have suggested that
assisted suicide is somehow connected to the purposes and privi-
leges of constitutional citizenship because intentional death rep-
resents the ultimate in "being left alone" as a result of free
choice.
The Original Article disputed the argument that the Constitu-
tion promotes unrestrained autonomy as a "noble objective."' 94
Of interest here is the related argument that the "right to be left
alone" is so broad as to encompass the complete alienation from
life and society.
A survey of constitutionally cognizable interests reveals the
close relationship between each interest and the capacity to
exist, move freely, and form attachments in society. Thus, "mar-
riage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." 95 The right to raise a family encompasses
"the high duty[] to recognize and prepare [children] for addi-
tional obligations" in life.196 The right of parents to train and
direct their children is essential because "[a] democratic society
rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
implies." 97 The right to an education, "where the state has
undertaken to provide it," provides "the very foundation of good
citizenship" because "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education." 98 Finally, the Constitution recognizes an interest in
employment because it pertains to an individual's "standing and
associations in [the] community" and capacity to earn a
livelihood. 99
In view of the nexus between these interests and one's social
existence, a "right to be left alone" must be understood as an
193. Quill, 80 F.3d at 727 (quoting Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 337 (1986)).
194. Marzen, supra note 1, at 13-14.
195. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
196. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
197. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
198. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
199. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). But see New Motor Vehicle
Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1349 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., sitting as Circuit
Justice and granting stay) (opining that while an interest in engaging in gainful occupa-
tion is constitutionally cognizable, constitutional protection does not extend to an interest
in locating one's business whenever and wherever one chooses).
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interest in moving about freely in society without arbitrary or
unjustified interference from the government, and not as an
interest in precluding all social interaction whatsoever by killing
one's self. Even if citizens are free to pursue a way of life "apart
from the conventional 'mainstream'," thereby "isolating them-
selves from all worldly influences," 00 this interest is distinguish-
able from an interest in no life at all. The former concerns the
preservation of life and freedom within society; in the case of
monasticism, for example, the preservation of "important values
of the civilization." 20 1 The latter concerns only a form of aliena-
tion and self-destruction which directly opposes societal values.
Thus, on the basis of this analysis, a rational continuum between
assisted suicide and other constitutionally cognizable interests is
nonexistent.
IV. DOES THE CONSTITUTION MANDATE A SPECIAL EXEMPTION
FROM A UNIFORM CRIMINAL LAW BANNING
ASSISTED SUICIDE?
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Constitution rec-
ognizes an interest in hastening one's death, a proposition clearly
opposed to history and tradition, then to what extent should such
an interest be protected from state interference? Neither the
Ninth nor Second Circuit proposed an unlimited right to pur-
posely hasten death or precluded the states from interfering with
such an interest in at least some cases. Both courts opined that
in a variety of circumstances, the states' interests in prohibiting
assisted suicide as a means of hastening death may outweigh the
individual interest in obtaining such assistance. However, both
courts concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment required the
states to exempt from criminal punishment those physicians who
assist in the suicides of the terminally ill by prescribing lethal
dosages of medication.0 2
Does the Constitution mandate the creation of a special
exemption whenever a uniform criminal ban happens to burden
the exercise of a protected right? The following section examines
an important Supreme Court decision addressing this question.
200. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222-23 (1972).
201. Id. at 223.
202. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 836-38; Quill, 80 F.3d at 729-31.
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A. The Supreme Court Has Refused to Grant Special
Exemptions From Generally Applicable Criminal Laws
Even When Such Laws Burden Constitutionally
Cognizable Interests
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith,203 the Supreme Court signalled that constitu-
tional exemptions would rarely be granted under the Fourteenth
Amendment. °4 The Court rejected the claim that the religious
use of peyote should be exempted from a "neutral, generally
applicable" criminal law banning the possession of dangerous
drugs.20 5 According to the Court, "if prohibiting the exercise of
religion.., is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision",
then the Constitution "has not been offended.
" 206
The Court's analysis applies with equal force to laws banning
suicide assistance. If, as conceded by the Ninth and Second Cir-
cuits, such laws are constitutional as applied to suicide assist-
ance by nonphysicians, to forms of assistance other than a lethal
prescription, or to the assisted suicides of individuals who are not
terminally ill, then the Constitution likewise should not be
offended by the ban's application to physician-prescribed lethal
overdoses to the terminally ill.
A general ban on assisted suicide has as its object the prohibi-
tion of any criminal assistance with another's suicide, regardless
of whether a physician is involved, drugs are used, or the victim
is already dying. Thus it does not single out the assisted suicides
of the terminally ill who seek to exercise a purported interest in
hastening death by requesting a physician's prescription of a
lethal drug overdose. Nor is it aimed at interfering with all the
means by which an interest in hastening death might be exer-
cised, since it only encompasses assistance and does not reach
self-suicide. In prohibiting all forms of suicide assistance, but
not all forms of hastening death, it only incidentally burdens the
limited constitutional interest created by the Ninth and Second
Circuits. Thus it is no different from a uniform ban on the pos-
203. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
204. While the claim before the Court was decided on First Amendment grounds, it
was brought under the Fourteenth Amendment which recognizes First Amendment
claims against the states. Id. at 877-78.
205. Id. at 890.
206. Id. Justice O'Connor also rejected the claim before the Court but declined to
join the Court's reasoning. Justice O'Connor favored the incorporation of a balancing test
to weigh the state interests in enforcing a law across-the-board against the individual
interest in a special exemption. See infra notes 215-217 and accompanying text.
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session of drugs that prohibits the use of drugs for religious pur-
poses, but does not prohibit all religious expression.
The plaintiffs in Smith argued that even if an "exemption from
generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be
extended to religiously motivated actors," the Court nevertheless
should follow its precedents in other religious freedom cases by
weighing the state's interests in enforcing a uniform ban against
the individual's motivation for violating the ban.2 °7 Under such a
balancing test, an exemption should be granted whenever the
state interest is less than compelling and the individual interest
touches on a core religious concern.2 °s
The Court rejected this approach because it would "produce
here... a private right to ignore generally applicable laws" that
"contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense."20 9
Nor would an inquiry to determine whether the personal interest
is central to one's religion meaningfully limit such a purported
right. According to the Court:
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the "centrality" of
religious beliefs before applying a "compelling interest" test in the
free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the "impor-
tance" of ideas before applying the "compelling interest" test in the
free speech field. What principle or logic can be brought to bear to
contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is "central" to his
personal faith?
210
The Court doubted "that the appropriate occasions for [creat-
ing constitutional exemptions] can be discerned by the courts."211
As a result, while:
Leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in[,] . . . that unavoidable consequence of democratic government
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto
itself or in which judges weight the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.2 12
In its Compassion in Dying decision, the Ninth Circuit con-
tended that an individual's interest in suicide raises "issues of
such profound spiritual importance" and "deeply affect[s a] right
207. Id. at 882-83.
208. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
209. Id. at 885, 886. Thus, requiring the states to demonstrate a compelling justifi-
cation for uniformly enforcing their laws whenever an individual complains of interfer-
ence with religious conduct "would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind". Id. at 888.
210. Id. at 886-87.
211. Id. at 890.
212. Id.
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to determine [one's] own destiny".213 If that is true, then the con-
cerns raised by the majority in Smith are relevant to the assisted
suicide context. By what criteria could a federal court distin-
guish between claims brought by the terminally ill, the
nonterminally ill but long-suffering, the financially distressed, or
the anxious beset with fears of losing control over their destiny?
If an individual asserts that access to physician-assisted suicide
is central to his or her personal notion of dignity, then judges
have no more constitutional basis for assessing the claim's com-
parative merits than they would for evaluating a religious free-
dom claim.214
Nevertheless, the court's rejection of a balancing test in Smith
has proven controversial and has spurred congressional legisla-
tion restoring the test to religious freedom cases.215 However,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence demonstrates that even when a
balancing test is applied, a favorable outcome for those seeking
the exemption is far from guaranteed.
Justice O'Connor argued that generally applicable laws bur-
dening religious interests must be subjected to a balancing test
that takes into account the comparative weights of the opposing
interests. She nevertheless concluded that the State's interest in
policing dangerous drugs justified a uniform ban that burdened
the religious use of peyote. She acknowledged that the criminal
prohibition of peyote "places a severe burden on the ability of
respondents to freely exercise their religion."216 Yet, she found
that the State's interest in the uniform application of its drug
laws outweighed any individual interest in a religious-based
"selective exemption".217
According to Justice O'Connor:
Although the question is close, I would conclude that uniform applica-
tion of Oregon's criminal prohibition is "essential to accomplish"...
its overriding interest in preventing the physical harm caused by the
use of a Schedule I controlled substance. Oregon's criminal prohibi-
tion represents that State's judgment that the possession and use of
controlled substances, even by only one person, is inherently harmful
and dangerous. Because the health effects caused by the use of con-
trolled substances exist regardless of the motivation of the user, the
use of such substances, even for religious purposes, violates the very
213. Compassion in Dying, 801 F.3d at 801.
214. For an excellent discussion on this point, see Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out
Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally Ill, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 799 (1994).
215. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (1994 & Supp.
1996).
216. Smith, 494 U.S. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
217. Id. at 903-905.
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purpose of the laws that prohibit them .... Moreover, in view of the
societal interest in preventing trafficking in controlled substances,
uniform application of the criminal prohibition at issue is essential to
the effectiveness of Oregon's stated interest in preventing any posses-
sion of peyote.
218
Justice O'Connor's concurrence only bolsters the proposition
that the states may choose to ban suicide assistance in all cases
in response to the legitimate concern that even "a little bit" is too
much. On one side of the scale, the states have no less interest in
the uniform application of its homicide laws than in banning the
possession of dangerous drugs. On the other side of the scale, an
unenumerated interest in purposely hastening the deaths of ter-
minally ill persons by physician-prescribed lethal overdoses
would hardly be more weighty than the enumerated right to
freely exercise one's religion. It would be anomalous, therefore, if
uniform laws imposing a severe burden on religious practices
were constitutional while uniform laws designed to protect life
itself and interfering with only one means of hastening death
were unconstitutional.
Regardless of the approach taken, the Court has rejected indi-
vidual claims of a right to a constitutional exemption in almost
every case.219 While at times the Court has employed a balanc-
ing test to exempt individuals from civil laws governing unem-
ployment compensation or school attendance,220 it has never on
this basis invalidated "an across-the-board criminal prohibition
on a particular form of conduct."
2 21
Thus the Ninth Circuit observed with good reason that
[d]eclaring a statute unconstitutional as applied to members of
a group is atypical."222 Yet this is exactly what the Ninth and
Second Circuits did in the assisted suicide cases. The next sec-
tion examines the courts' rationale for exempting physician-pre-
scribed lethal overdoses from the assisted suicide bans of
Washington and New York.
218. Id. at 905-06 (citations omitted).
219. The Court has mandated religious exemptions only in cases involving civil laws
which already avail procedures for granting individual exemptions on other grounds, or
which give rise to "hybrid" claims of interference with both religious and other protected
interests. Id. at 881-82.
220. Id. (citing various cases).
221. Smith, at 884-85 (emphasis added).
222. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798 n.9.
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B. A Special Exemption From Laws Banning Assisted Suicide
Based on Personal Preference or Life Expectancy Lacks
Any Constitutional Basis
The Ninth and Second Circuits asserted expressly or by impli-
cation that an exemption from uniformly enforced laws against
assisted suicide is constitutionally mandated in certain cases for
at least five reasons. First, the states had purportedly less inter-
est in prohibiting consensual killing than they did in prohibiting
nonconsensual killing.223 Second, they had purportedly less
interest in preventing suicides resulting from the exercise of
"competent" choices concerning the timing and manner of death
than they did in preventing "irrational" suicides motivated by
depression or duress.224 Third, they had purportedly less inter-
est in preventing the suicides of persons desiring to avoid pain
and suffering than they did in preventing suicides for other rea-
sons. 225  Fourth, the states had purportedly less interest in
preventing suicides resulting from physician-prescribed lethal
overdoses than they did in preventing suicides from other "less
dignified" means.226 Finally, they had purportedly less interest
in preventing the suicides of persons who will soon die of other
causes than they did in preventing the suicides of persons who
otherwise will live for a long time. 7
223. Id. at 820 (asserting that state's interest in protecting life is "dramatically
diminished" when victim does "not wish to pursue life"); Quill, at 833 (drawing "critical
line" between voluntary and involuntary "termination" of life); Quill 80 F.3d at 730
(asserting that individual interest overrides state interest in protecting life when patient
seeks death).
224. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 820 (holding that "the state has a clear inter-
est in preventing anyone, no matter what age, from taking his own life in a fit of despera-
tion, depression, or loneliness or as a result of any other problem, physical or
psychological, which can be significantly ameliorated"); Quill, 80 F.3d at 730 (holding
that the states "may establish rules and procedures to assure that all choices are free of
[psychological] pressure [to consent to death]").
225. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 800 (holding that the states had an interest in
avoiding "the senseless loss of a life ended prematurely" that did not apply to persons
who ended their lives "in order to avoid debilitating pain and a humiliating death"
because in such circumstances "suicide is not senseless, and death does not come too
early"); Quill, 80 F.3d at 730 (holding that the state has no "business ... requir[ing] the
continuation of agony when the result is imminent and inevitable").
226. Neither court expressly contrasted suicide by physician-prescribed lethal over-
dose with other forms of suicide such as by gunshot, hanging or jumping off a bridge, but
impliedly distinguish between the two categories of suicide by emphasizing the physi-
cian's role in assisting suicide as assuring a "dignified" suicide. Compassion in Dying, 79
F.3d at 832 (noting that suicides attempted without physician oversight would likely lead
to miscalculation causing "even more painful and lingering death"); Quill, 80 F.3d at 731
n.4 (opining that states may assert an interest in assuring the competence of prescribing
physicians).
227. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 821 (observing that while "some people who
contemplate suicide can be restored to a state of physical and mental well-being" persons
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Is consensual homicide different as a constitutional matter
from other forms of homicide when it is chosen by a competent,
terminally ill victim, and is motivated by a desire to avoid pain,
suffering, and the "undignified" natural processes of dying?
Nothing in the Constitution suggests this conclusion, and the
Supreme Court's decisions in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton228
(concerning consensual decisions based on personal preference)
and United States v. Rutherford229 (concerning protection of per-
sons with terminal conditions) provide, to the contrary, compel-
ling bases for rejecting such an assertion.
1. Consent and Personal Preference
In Slaton, the Court rejected a claim that "obscene, porno-
graphic films acquire constitutional immunity from state regula-
tion simply because they are exhibited for consenting adults
only."230 The Court acknowledged that its prior cases recognized
a compelling state interest in shielding juveniles and noncon-
senting adults from pornographic exposure. These cases did not,
however, establish a line of demarcation between consent and
lack of consent relative to the scope or strength of the state's
interest. According to the Court, "there are legitimate state
interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscen-
ity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards
against exposure to juveniles and to passersby."231 Thus not only
may the state assert an interest in thwarting consensual behav-
ior "to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and
the gullible from the exercise of their own volition,"23 2 but also a
state may asert an interest in cases not involving these protected
individuals.233 If the consensual activity "debase[s] and dis-
tort[s]"234 social relationships and adversely affects the "tone of
society,"235 then the activity is subject to a heightened state inter-
est in its prevention regardless of the willingness of individuals
to engage in the activity.
The Slaton analysis is particularly applicable to activities
deemed to be criminal because the criminal law transcends indi-
vidual preference. All crimes against another involve:
with terminal conditions "cannot be cured"); Quill, 80 F.3d at 729-30 (holding that state
has no interest "in requiring the prolongation of a life that is all but ended").
228. 413 U.S. 49 (1972).
229. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
230. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 57.
231. Id. at 57-58.
232. Id. at 64.
233. Id. at 58-60.
234. Id. at 63.
235. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 59.
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Three parties... one being the state, which for its own good does not
suffer the others to deal on a basis of contract with the public. It has
been stated, and perhaps rightly so, that the only true consent to a
criminal act is that of the community. This is so because these acts
... , even if done in private, have an impingement (whether direct or
indirect) upon the community at large in that the very doing of them
may tend to encourage their repetition and so to undermine public
morals .... To allow an otherwise criminal act to go unpunished
because of the victim's consent would not only threaten the security of
our society but also might tend to detract from the force of the moral
principles underlying the criminal law.
236
Thus, as Justice Harlan recognized in Poe v. Uliman :27
To attempt a line between public behavior and that which is purely
consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community concern
a range of subjects with which every society in civilized times has
found it necessary to deal .... If we had a case before us which
required us to decide simply, and in abstraction, whether the moral
judgment implicit in the application of [statutes governing euthana-
sia and suicide, among other subjects] was a sound one, the very con-
troversial nature of these questions would, I think, require us to
hesitate long before concluding that the Constitution precluded [the
states] from choosing ... among these various views.
2 3 8
The Court in Slaton noted that the "state statute books are
replete with constitutionally unchallenged laws against . . . sui-
cide [and similar criminal activities] even though these crimes
may only directly involve 'consenting adults'."2 39 This assertion
persuaded the Court to reject the proposition "that conduct
which directly involves 'consenting adults' only has, for that sole
reason, a special claim to constitutional protection."241 Instead,
"[tihe States have the power make a morally neutral judgment
that [certain consensual activities tend] to injure the community
as a whole, to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize ... the
States' 'right ... to maintain a decent society'."24 '
The parameters of the specific exemption claimed in Compas-
sion in Dying and Quill add nothing to the analysis. An agree-
ment by consenting adults that direct killing by physician-
prescribed medication is appropriate to avoid pain, suffering and
"undignified dying" rests solely on personal preference. Others
may prefer to avoid long-term disability, loneliness or a host of
other human experiences. Individuals may prefer to be assisted
236. State v. Brown, 364 A.2d 27,29, 32 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (quotations
and citations omitted).
237. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
238. Id. at 546, 547.
239. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 68 n.15.
240. Id. at 68.
241. Id. at 69 (citation omitted).
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by spouse or by firing squad. Individuals may prefer death by
noose, sword or gunshot.242 To hold as a constitutional matter
that the states have less interest in preventing suicide assistance
because the victim happens to prefer a physician-prescribed
lethal overdose is to hold without justification that the states
have less interest in preventing suicide assistance whenever the
assistance provided comports with the victim's preferences.
In a different context, the Supreme Court has observed:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed
as a barrier to reasonable state regulation... if it is based on purely
secular considerations.... [T]he very concept of ordered liberty pre-
cludes allowing every person to make his own standards of conduct in
which society as a whole has important interests. [Thus personal
preference based on secular considerations will be given no constitu-
tional weight.]243
If an unrestrained "way of life" poses such a threat to ordered
liberty, then the unrestrained operation of personal preferences
in choosing a "way of death" poses an equal if not greater threat.
In addition, as the following section indicates, when the Consti-
tution takes life expectancy into account as a measure under the
242. In a letter to the New York Times, one individual objected to imposing gun
controls in the suicide context, by stating the following:
[W]hat if a terminally ill person decides to end his suffering privately by using a
gun (as Ernest Hemingway did) instead of seeking the assistance of, say, Dr. Jack
Kevorkian? Do we condemn the act merely because of the method?... While we all
want protection from crime, do we equally want to be deprived of all control over
how and when we die?
Carol R. Lockett, Letter to the Editor: Gun Control and Suicide, N.Y. Tnmes, Mar. 15,
1996, at A14.
243. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). The Court distinguished a
"way of life" based on secular preferences from one based on religious belief. Yoder, 406
U.S. at 215-16. "Philosophical and personal" choices would "not rise to the demands of the
Religion Clauses". Id. at 216. While Justice Stevens has claimed that one's perspective
on death depends on one's "faith," Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
343 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting), it would be difficult for proponents of assisted suicide
to satisfy the Court's stringent test for determining whether the belief at issue is for con-
stitutional purposes religious in nature. In Yoder, the Court found that the Amish view-
point opposing the public education of their own children was a religious belief because it
stemmed from biblical directives, was practiced for over three hundred years, and was
part of the strictly enforced rules of an identifiable church community. Yoder, 406 U.S. at
216-19. Conversely, beliefs about assisted suicide most likely would fail such a test.
Opinion surveys have indicated that support for assisted suicide is significantly more
likely to be found among those who reject any religious affiliation or are hostile to the
religious beliefs of their church on the matter, and who base their support on philosophi-
cal grounds or personal ethics. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Phy-
sician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes and Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and
the Public, 347 LANCET 1805, 1808 (1996); Larry Seidlitz et al., Attitudes of Older People
Toward Suicide and Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of Gallup Poll Findings, 43 J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc'v 993, 995 (1995); Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physi-
cians and the Public Toward Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Eutha-
nasia, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 303, 308 (1996).
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law of the value of an individual's life, the threat to ordered lib-
erty is further increased.
2. Terminal Condition
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rutherford
244
informs the debate over whether the Constitution mandates an
exemption from assisted suicide laws for the assistance of per-
sons with terminal conditions. The Court considered whether a
statutory definition of unsafe drugs reasonably applied to drugs
used by persons with terminal cancer.245 Although the Court
declined to address the constitutional question of whether a ter-
minally ill person's right to privacy mandated an exemption from
a law banning the interstate transfer of unsafe drugs, the Court's
definitional analysis supports the denial of such an exemption.246
The Court referred to a balancing process employed by the
enforcement agency to determine whether a drug was safe or
unsafe. According to the Court, "the Commissioner [of the Food
and Drug Administration] generally considers a drug safe when
the expected therapeutic gain justifies the risk entailed by its
use."247 The lower courts had contended that given the inevita-
bility of proximate death from natural causes, the quantitative
significance of a drug's risk of death to persons with terminal
conditions was either inherently de minimis or at the very least
difficult to assess.24 By implication, the drug-induced deaths of
individuals expectedly near death bore a tenuous and perhaps
nonexistent relationship to the "prophylactic purpose " 249 of a law
designed to protect life.
The Court rejected this line of reasoning by asserting: "For the
terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential
for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the possibil-
ity of therapeutic benefit."250 On one hand, therefore, "safety con-
siderations have relevance for terminal cancer patients",25' while
on the other hand, by implication, the natural life expectancy of a
patient is irrelevant to the balance between the governmental
244. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
245. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
246. After remanding the case to the Tenth Circuit to address the constitutional
claim, which the Tenth Circuit denied, the Supreme Court refused to review the case.
Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980).
247. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 555.
248. Rutherford v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 506, 509 (W. D. Okla. 1977); Ruther-
ford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 1978).
249. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 554.




interest in preventing drug-induced deaths and the patient's
interest in taking the drug for his or her own purposes.
As a result, the prevention of drug-induced deaths among the
terminally ill, as for anyone else, reasonably furthers the protec-
tive purposes of a law banning assisted suicide. The balance
between state and private interests does not shift under the Con-
stitution according to the victim's natural life expectancy. Thus,
the terminally ill are similarly situated to everyone else in rela-
tion to the states' interest in protecting life. For the Court to
hold otherwise, the Court would have to abandon its unanimous
decision in Rutherford.
Other factors militate against a condition-based exemption as
well. In the religious freedom context, "the Court must not
ignore the danger that an exception from a general obligation of
citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establish-
ment Clause."252 In the assisted suicide context, an exemption
from criminal prosecution for homicide based on the condition of
the crime victim may violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection is offended by
"considerations ... deemed to reflect prejudice and apathy - a
view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others."253 Penalizing suicide assistance in cases
involving nonterminally ill victims while exempting from punish-
ment those who assist in the suicides of the terminally ill creates
an egregious double standard. The law would deter those who
would assist in the suicides of the nonterminally ill while it
would encourage or at least not impede the suicide assistance of
the terminally ill. Such an exemption would apply not because
the suicide victim desires to hasten death, but because the sui-
cide victim desiring death has a natural life expectancy of short
duration. The discriminatory inference is unavoidable: The lives
of the terminally ill who desire to die are not as worthy or deserv-
ing of protection under the law as the lives of the nonterminally
ill who also desire to die. Assisting members of the latter group
would continue to constitute a grave public offense while assist-
ing the suicide of the former would not.
Such a constitutionally-imposed dichotomy would be unprece-
dented. Even African-American slaves were protected against
homicide under the pre-Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
laws of the several states.25' The criminal law, especially the
252. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
253. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1984).
254. See 80 C.J.S. Slaves § 8(b) (1955); Fields v. Tennessee, 10 Tenn. 156 (2 Yer.
141) (1829) (providing: "the offence of manslaughter, when a negro or mulatto slave is the
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homicide code, provides the basic foundation of a free society in
pursuit of ordered liberty. The criminal law thereby assumes a
critical role in the preservation and protection of human life
itself, and criminal law's uniform application to all persons
expresses, as no other state action can, the government's recogni-
tion of the equality of lives under the law. Carving out a consti-
tutionally-imposed exception into the homicide code based on the
victim's terminal condition or any other equally irrelevant per-
sonal characteristic prohibits the uniform protection of the ina-
lienable right to life that is fundamental to the scheme of ordered
liberty. As such, a condition-based exemption to homicide con-
flicts with the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, the Court observed in Rutherford that "with dis-
eases such as cancer it is often impossible to identify a patient as
terminally ill except in retrospect."25 Individuals considered ter-
minally ill "may have unexpected remissions and may respond to
conventional treatment."256 Thus, an exemption will likely erro-
neously include "patients characterized as 'terminal' who could
actually be helped by legitimate therapy."257 In addition, the
Court emphasized that while the ruling below was "limited to
Laetrile, its reasoning cannot be so readily confined. To accept
the proposition that [the Act has] no relevance for terminal
patients is to deny the Commissioner's authority over all drugs,
however toxic or ineffectual, for such individuals."258 All these
factors provided additional justification for "protect[ing] the ter-
minally ill, no less than other patients."259
In the religious freedom context, the Court has disfavored the
constitutional creation of religious exemptions because of the
wide variety of religious preferences expressed in our society. To
recognize an exemption for any one particular religious practice
"would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct
proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs."26 ' The
same concern arises in the assisted suicide context, given the
subject of it, from our criminal code, exists by the common law; because it is the unlawful
killing of a human being").
255. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 556.
256. Id. at 557.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 558. Though the Court did not advert to it, the inherent expansiveness of
a proximity-of-death exemption also is relevant. A "limited" exemption for persons with
"terminal conditions" would invite a continuous flow of court challenges seeking to
expand the definition to encompass a variety of conditions. See Marzen, 'Out, Out Brief
Candle, supra note 214, at 814-19.




medical difficulty in accurately predicting when an individual
will die from natural causes, the inherently expansive nature of
the definition of "terminal condition," the infinite varieties of kill-
ing methods that an individual might deem essential to personal
dignity, and the essential similarity of assisted suicide to other
forms of homicide such as murder.
Consequently, a legal accommodation will be impossible to
maintain between policies upholding the sanctity and equality of
life and the fundamentally divergent claim to an exemption
licensing the taking of life in particular cases. Neither society
nor the federal courts can reasonably expect to "weigh" such pro-
foundly opposed interests, such as to reach some stabilizing "bal-
ance," constitutional or otherwise, between the protection of life
and the purposive destruction of life. Instead, a condition-based
exemption to the homicide code not only courts anarchy, it
embraces it.
V. CONSTITUTIONALIZING ASSISTED SUICIDE: CAN WE LIVE
WITH THE CONSEQUENCES?
The Original Article predicted that numerous negative conse-
quences would occur if the Supreme Court recognized assisted
suicide as a constitutional right.26' Such a ruling would render
the uniform, generally applicable homicide laws in every state
constitutionally suspect.262 A constitutional right to assisted sui-
cide would place in question the "operative presumption" in the
civil law that persons desiring suicide are mentally ill.263 Addi-
tionally, such a right would provide the basis for subsequent rul-
ings extending the right to minors and to persons with mentally
incapacitating conditions. 264 Its application would be difficult to
limit to persons with terminal conditions or to a narrow range of
motives.265
A constitutional right to assisted suicide would also encourage
persons who suffer from depression and other mental disorders
to seek suicide assistance. 266 It would increase the socioeconomic
and internal pressures that induce suicide among certain vulner-
able populations; those encountering stress from financial or
occupational difficulties, those experiencing pain, suffering,
physical illness, grief, prejudice or oppression, and those endur-
261. Marzen et. al, supra note 1, at 100-47.
262. Id. at 101.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 101-02.
265. Id. at 104-07.
266. Marzen et. al., supra note 1, at 107-27.
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ing the ups and downs of adolescence. 26 7 Finally, the right would
render suicide more socially acceptable, thereby increasing the
risk of cluster or mass suicides, and coerced or manipulated
suicides.268
The Ninth and Second Circuits dismissed such concerns after
concluding that the supposed benefits of hastened death out-
weighed the risks.269 Both courts placed undue confidence in the
capability of procedural safeguards and physicians to oversee
and weed out the "good" from the tragic suicides.2 70 Finally, the
courts even endorsed some of the undesirable consequences cited
in the Original Article.
2 71
If the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth and Second Circuits,
then it will do more than expose countless individuals to what
many consider to be a terrible social policy with its attendant
threats of increased harm. The Court would establish as a con-
stitutional objective the securing of an individual's right to the
purposeful taking of life. Thus, the Court would constitutionally
guarantee an individual's access to lethal measures when neces-
sary to avoid life of an undesired quality. Moreover, by exempt-
ing those charged with a criminal offense in cases involving a
victim with a terminal diagnosis, the Court would institute a sys-
tem of constitutional apartheid based on physical condition.
These are consequences of a unique and unprecedented magni-
tude because they imperil ordered liberty itself.
272
From the time that the defining principles of our form of self-
government were only ruminations in the minds of influential
267. Id. at 127-39.
268. Id. at 139-46.
269. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 836-37; Quill, 80 F.3d at 729-30.
270. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832-34; Quill, 80 F.3d at 730.
271. For example, the Ninth Circuit considered assisted suicide to be the appropri-
ate response to the victims' "concern for the economic welfare of their loved ones" espe-
cially when "the costs of protracted health care can be so exorbitant." Compassion in
Dying, 79 F.3d at 826. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that "a decision of a duly
appointed surrogate decisionmaker is for all legal purposes the decision of the patient
himself," (Id. at 832 n.120), and espoused assisted suicide through surrogate decision spe-
cifically for patients disabled by persistent unconsciousness. Id. at 816. The Second Cir-
cuit provided the foundation for legalizing assisted suicide in a broad range of cases by
equating assisted suicide with the refusal of treatment and holding, in effect, that when
the refusal of treatment is authorized by law, then assisted suicide should be authorized
as well. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
272. As already discussed supra, the Court has never before recognized a personal
interest because of its death hastening effect, but has only extended constitutional protec-
tion to those interests bearing some nexus to existence and societal participation while at
the same time limiting such interests to the extent they create the risk of injury or death.
In addition, the Court has refused to recognize "any constitutional guarantee of access to
dwellings of a particular quality" because "the Constitution does not provide judicial rem-
edies for every social and economic ill." Linsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). A
decision to affirm the Ninth and Second Circuits would reverse these precedents.
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philosophers such as John Locke, the duty "not to quit [one's] sta-
tion willfully"2 73 has served and continues to serve a critical func-
tion. Observing the duty of noninterference with respect to one's
own life as well as the lives of others corresponds to what Locke
describes as the "great and chief end" of those who "seek out and
[are] willing to join in society," which is "the mutual preservation
of their lives."274 As a result, whole segments of society have
come to rely on the law's commitment to the equal protection of
life. Vulnerable persons can be particularly secure knowing that
authorities will treat their depression-induced request for a
lethal prescription as a call for help in living and not in ending
life. Vulnerable persons may also depend on the law's deterrent
effect to shield them from the misguided compassion of others
willing to provide suicide assistance.
The law's commitment to life assures vulnerable persons and
those who care for them that the increasingly insistent "sugges-
tions" emanating from the private sector to "get out of the way"
will not be woven into the very fabric of the criminal and civil
laws. It is unsettling enough that juries in prosecutions for
assisted suicide have ignored the law by letting the likes of Jack
Kevorkian go free based not on the lack of the defendant's culpa-
bility, but on the victim's duress-induced consent and disabling
condition.
A constitutional ruling in favor of the assisted suicide claims
would "occasion... an unprecedented upheaval"275 in the laws of
all fifty states, in social and professional mores, and in the hearts
of the vulnerable who at times have valued themselves only
because the law values them. The underlying rationale of such a
ruling, that the lives of some are not as worthy as the lives of
others, would insinuate itself into policies at every level that
happen to apply to those whose desires are suicidal or whose
death is proximate. 76 As a result, a ruling in favor of assisted
273. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES oF GovERNMENT 271 (Peter Laslett ed., student
ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
274. Id. at 350.
275. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 56 (1973).
276. For example, authorities in San Francisco recently initiated a program to
thwart suicide attempts on the Golden Gate Bridge. Rather than building additional
physical barriers, the bridge's board of directors authorized anti-suicide patrols to rove
the walkways and intervene in potential suicides. The patrols will be trained by the San
Francisco Suicide Prevention agency in techniques for counselling people with suicidal
impulses. If as a matter of constitutional law the lives of suicidal persons with terminal
conditions have no value, then the suicide patrols would have no basis for preventing
persons with terminal conditions from exercising their constitutional right to hasten their
deaths by jumping from the bridge. See Carey Goldberg, Golden Gate Bridge to Start
Patrols to Prevent Suicides, N.Y. TudEs, Feb. 25, 1996, at 10. See also Diane Gianelli,
State Seeks to Deny Transplants to Death Row Inmates, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 26, 1996, at
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suicide would be construed by the vulnerable as a constitutional
invitation to end their lives.2 vv
For these reasons, the law should not abandon individuals to
their suicidal urges under the solicitous guise of protecting indi-
vidual rights. Instead:
The deliberate taking of a human life should remain a crime. This
rejection of a change in the law to permit doctors to intervene to end a
person's life is not just a subordination of individual well-being to
social policy. It is instead, an affirmation of the supreme value of the
individual, no matter how worthless and hopeless that individual may
feel.
2 78
The rulings in Compassion in Dying and Quill have chal-
lenged the core values of our societal covenant by granting to
physicians a license to engage in homicide. Based on theories
absent in our traditional legal and social schemes, the Second
and Ninth Circuits have crossed a line that previously described
freedom's limits, and not its essence. These courts have called
into question our historical rejection of suicide assistance and
other forms of consensual killing and would, if upheld, effectively
reverse numerous constitutional precedents in a range of other
fields. The Supreme Court should decline the invitation to
reduce the Constitution to a suicide pact. Instead, the Court
should uphold the uniform bans against assisted suicide at issue
in these cases because they preserve ordered liberty and affirm
the equal worth of all persons under the law.
5 (reporting on proposed legislation in state of Washington that would deny organ trans-
plants for prisoners on death row; one supporter of the bill "maintains that it is futile to
give death row inmates organ transplants 'because, if the penalty phase is carried out,
you're going to execute him a couple of months later'").
277. Nat Hentoff, Disabled Group Yells We're "Not Dead Yet": Activists Worry Legal-
izing Assisted Suicide Spells Doom for the Handicapped, DET. NEWS, July 28, 1996, at 5B
(indicating that disability activists are concerned that Ninth and Second Circuit decisions
will sweep persons with disabling conditions into assisted suicide by reinforcing notion
that life with a terminal disability is worse than death); Mary Johnson, Voluntary Eutha-
nasia: The Next Frontier?, 8 IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 343 (1992); Paul Steven Miller, the
Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with Disabilities - Is It a Right Without Freedom?,
9 IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 47 (1993); Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide
and Social Prejudice, 3 IssuEs iN LAW & MED. 141 (1987).
278. BRIrIsH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, EUTHANAsIA: REPORT OF THE WORIING PARTY
To REvIEw THE BRIrIsH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION'S GUIDANCE ON EUTHANASIA 69 (1988).
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